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Abstract
The problem of understanding quantum mechanics is in large measure the problem
of finding appropriate ways of thinking about the spatial and temporal aspects of
the physical world. The standard, substantival, set-theoretic conception of space is
inconsistent with quantum mechanics, and so is the doctrine of local realism, the
principle of local causality, and the mathematical physicist’s golden calf, determin-
ism. The said problem is made intractable by our obtruding onto the physical world
a theoretical framework that is more detailed than the physical world. This frame-
work portraits space and time as infinitely and intrinsically differentiated, whereas
the physical world is only finitely differentiated spacewise and timewise, namely to
the extent that spatiotemporal relations and distinctions are warranted by facts.
This has the following consequences: (i) The contingent properties of the physical
world, including the times at which they are possessed, are indefinite and extrinsic.
(ii) We cannot think of reality as being built “from the bottom up”, out of locally
instantiated physical properties. Instead we must conceive of the physical world as
being built “from the top down”: By entering into a multitude of spatial relations
with itself, “existence itself” takes on both the aspect of a spatially differentiated
world and the aspect of a multiplicity of formless relata, the fundamental particles.
At the root of our interpretational difficulties is the “cookie cutter paradigm”, ac-
cording to which the world’s synchronic multiplicity is founded on the introduction
of surfaces that carve up space in the manner of three-dimensional cookie cutters.
The neurophysiological underpinnings of this insidious notion are discussed.
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“I feel that the real joke that the eternal inventor of enigmas has
presented us with has absolutely not been understood as yet.”
Albert Einstein [1, p. 411]
1 Introduction
Quantum mechanics is an incredibly successful theory. No experiment, no observation,
has ever given the lie to it. But if it is not lying, what does it tell us about the world?
A fairly typical answer is: Nothing; quantum mechanics concerns statistical regularities
in the behavior of measuring instruments; any attempt to go beyond the “brute facts”,
to give a realistic or epistemological account of how it is that the statistical regulari-
ties predicted by quantum mechanics come out the way they do, is idle metaphysics.
Considering the widely divergent and more or less bizarre accounts that abound, this
resigned attitude appears justified. But is it?
In this essay I examine the metaphysical presuppositions that stand in the way of
making sense of quantum mechanics and trace them to their neurophysiological under-
pinnings. Because these underpinnings to a considerable extent determine the nature of
the phenomenal world and consequently prejudice our thinking about the physical world,
rejecting those presuppositions is no easy task. But it is worth the effort, for at the end
we shall find that the mathematical elegance and simplicity of quantum mechanics is
matched by the depth and transparency of its ontological message.
The problem of understanding quantum mechanics is in large measure the problem
of finding appropriate ways of thinking about the spatial and temporal aspects of the
physical world. Section 2 contrasts the salient features of phenomenal space with the
standard mathematical description of physical space. It is argued that the standard
description has empirically unwarranted features that stand in the way of finding the
right interpretation. An alternative, essentially relationalist way of thinking is proposed.
In the sections that follow the relevant empirical findings are progressively taken
into account. Section 3 takes account of the existence of noncomposite entities, a.k.a.
the fundamental particles of matter. Its chief conclusion is that these entities must be
thought of as formless. The still prevalent notion that a fundamental particles has a
(pointlike) form is an unwarranted (in fact, illegitimate) importation from the phenom-
enal world into the world of physics. The form of a material object is the set of its
internal spatial relations. An object that lacks internal spatial relations also lacks a
form.
Section 4 takes account of the behavior of indistinguishable particles. It is argued
that a fundamental particle is not something to which existence is contingently at-
tributable. The basic reality of matter is a single entity, and this entity cannot be
qualified as anything more particular or determinate than “existence itself”. Consid-
ered in relation to each other, fundamental particles are instances of “existence itself”.
Considered out of relation to other particles, each fundamental particle is “existence
itself”. The individuation or multiple instantiation of this entity is discussed.
2
Section 5 takes account of the behavior of electrons in two-slit interference experi-
ments. This behavior is Nature’s corroboration of the relationalist conception of phys-
ical space developed in Secs. 2 and 3. It is argued that the standard, substantival,
set-theoretic conception of space is as inconsistent with quantum mechanics as absolute
simultaneity is with special relativity. So, therefore, is the doctrine of local realism, the
principle of local causality, and the mathematical physicist’s golden calf, determinism.
Section 6 deals with two frequent mistakes, the error of the instrumentalist, who
rejects all efforts to make ontological sense of quantum mechanics, and the error of the
quantum realist, who considers probability one sufficient for the existence of an ele-
ment of reality. While the instrumentalist errs by ignoring the possibility of a quantum
world with extrinsic properties, the quantum realist errs by ignoring that the properties
of the quantum world, including the times at which they are possessed, are extrinsic:
They “dangle” from what happens or is the case in the rest of the world. The contin-
gent properties of the quantum world exist precisely to the extent that their values are
indicated.
Section 7 pinpoints the sense in which the relative positions of the world’s mate-
rial constituents are indefinite. This involves reference to objective probabilities, which
can be assigned only to counterfactuals. The very possibility of assigning objective
probabilities to the possible results of an unperformed measurement entails that the
possessed values of quantum-mechanical observables are extrinsic. The extrinsic na-
ture of the world’s contingent properties thus follows directly from their indefiniteness.
Hence unless we are willing to take seriously the extrinsic nature of quantum-mechanical
properties, we shall not be in a position to make proper sense of the indefiniteness that
is the hallmark of quantum mechanics, and hence of quantum mechanics itself.
While even a macroscopic object (defined in Sec. 7) has a position only because of
the facts from which this can be inferred, the dependence of its position on position-
indicating facts is a qualitative (ontological or existential) dependence, not a quantitative
one. For the quantitative purposes of physics, it is legitimate to ignore this dependence,
to consider macroscopic positions as intrinsic, and to apply to them classical causal
concepts. This is fortunate, for otherwise quantum mechanics would be inconsistent,
inasmuch as its very formulation presupposes a classical domain of positions that can
be thought of as being factual per se. Causality nevertheless is emergent; it is not
part of the ontological foundation. All the determining that goes on in the physical
world is the determining of probabilities associated with possibilities. There aren’t any
causally determined facts. The quantum formalism concerns probabilistic correlations
among facts – diachronic correlations between facts indicating properties of the same
system at different times and synchronic correlations between facts indicating properties
of different systems in spacelike separation, – and it is these correlations that explain
why causal explanations work to the extent they do. Trying to causally explain the
correlations would be putting the cart in front of the horse. All of this is explained in
Sec. 8.
The seemingly intractable problem of understanding quantum mechanics is largely
due to our obtruding onto the physical world a theoretical framework that is more de-
tailed than the physical world, in that it portraits space and time as infinitely and
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intrinsically differentiated. Section 9 shows that the physical world is only finitely dif-
ferentiated spacewise and timewise, namely to the extent that spatiotemporal relations
and distinctions are warranted by facts. As a consequence, we cannot think of reality as
being built “from the bottom up”, on an infinitely and intrinsically differentiated space,
out of locally instantiated physical properties. Instead we must conceive of the physi-
cal world as being built “from the top down”: By entering into a multitude of spatial
relations with itself, “existence itself” takes on both the aspect of a spatially differen-
tiated world and the aspect of a multiplicity of relata – the fundamental particles. By
allowing the spatial relations to change, it takes on the further aspect of a temporally
differentiated world.
The final section homes in on the idea that is at the root of our interpretational dif-
ficulties, traces its philosophical fallout, and examines its neurophysiological underpin-
nings. This is the “cookie cutter paradigm”, according to which the world’s synchronic
multiplicity is founded on the introduction of surfaces that carve up space in the manner
of three-dimensional cookie cutters.
2 The Reality of Spatial Continuity
The problem of understanding quantum mechanics is in large measure the problem of
finding appropriate ways of thinking about the spatial and temporal aspects of the
physical world. The way we think about space is obviously indebted to our awareness
of phenomenal space, the three-dimensional expanse which contains both sensory per-
cepts (a.k.a. qualia or introspectible properties) and visual images.1 One of the things
that quantum mechanics is trying to tell us is that the way we are accustomed to think
about space is more appropriate for dealing with the spatial aspect of the phenomenal
world than it is for dealing with the spatial aspect of the physical world. In the follow-
ing sections I will successively introduce the relevant empirical data and examine their
implications. In the present section I focus on what we can learn by paying attention
to our direct awareness of phenomenal space and by contrasting it with the standard
mathematical representation of physical space.
Physicists routinely represent space as a transfinite set of point individuals in one-
to-one correspondence with triplets of real numbers. This mathematical representation
lacks certain features that are vital for interpreting quantum mechanics correctly, and it
possesses certain empirically unwarranted features that stand in the way of finding the
correct interpretation. The features that are lacking are the quality of continuous spatial
extension and a unity that goes beyond the unity of a set, defined by Cantor [5, p. 204]
as “a Many that allows itself to be thought of as a One”. The empirically unwarranted
features are the multiplicity that is inherent in the set R3 of all triplets of real numbers
and the intrinsic distinctness of the members of R3.
1Neuroscience is increasingly backing the notion that experience and imagination share the same
space. There is mounting evidence that visual perception and visual imagery compete for the same
processing mechanisms, and that the neural processes which produce visual percepts and those which
produce visual images are to some extent the same [2, 3, 4].
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Consider the visual image of a line. This is in an obvious sense continuously extended
in one spatial dimension. If the line is unbounded, we can set up a one-to-one correspon-
dence between the set R of real numbers and points on the line; if it is bounded, we can
set up a one-to-one correspondence between any finite interval of R and points on the
line. What is important is that these points do not exist in advance of any one-to-one
correspondence that we may set up. They are introduced into the line by our setting
up such a correspondence. The line is in an obvious sense divisible into segments, but
nothing in its image warrants the notion that it is intrinsically multiple, let alone that it
is a concatenation of point individuals with the cardinality of the real numbers. While
between two distinct real numbers a, b there exists a nondenumerable set S of real num-
bers, between the points that correspond to a and b there exists a perfectly continuous
and intrinsically undifferentiated line segment L. S and L are entirely different things.
S possesses something that L lacks, namely the multiplicity of a nondenumerable set
and the distinctness of its members. L possesses something that S lacks, namely the
quality of continuous spatial extension and the unity of an intrinsically undivided whole.
Unfortunately, we are so accustomed to conflating the continuity of phenomenal
space with the discreteness of R3 that it has become almost impossible for us to tease
them apart. We tend to visualize the reals as a continuous line without realizing that
the very act of visualization introduces a qualitative element that is not warranted
by the mathematical construction of the reals. Conversely, in our attempt to get a
conceptual grip on physical space we seize on the reals as a set that appears to contain
sufficiently many elements to “fill” a continuous line and thus to possess its continuity.
We even deprive ourselves of the words that are needed to distinguish between S and
L, as when we use the adjectives “continuous” and “discrete” to qualify sets. In what
follows, all words starting with the letters “c-o-n-t-i-n-u” will signify (possession of)
that continuity which is an obvious pre-theoretical feature of our visual percepts and
images, and “discrete” will refer to that discreteness which is an obvious property of
every “Many that allows itself to be thought of as a One”.
Continuity, so defined, is a feature of objects in phenomenal space (that is, of visual
percepts and visual images), and it is not a feature of any mathematical set. Is continuity
a feature of objects in physical space?2 Does it exist in the physical world? These
questions are quite analogous to the following: Does the turquoise of a tropical lagoon
exist in physical space (that is, is it an objective property of the lagoon)? Few would
venture an affirmative answer. Qualia belong to phenomenal space; they are correlated
with certain physical quantities but are themselves not physical.3 But the continuity
of phenomenal space is as much a qualitative feature of our visual percepts as is the
sensation of turquoise. It eludes mathematical description just as definitely as does the
2The phraseology which depicts space as some kind of container in which objects are situated is
common enough, but it must not be taken literally. Phenomenal space contains neither in the set-
theoretic sense of “containment” nor in the sense in which a closed surface b encompasses its interior.
Neither of these senses is applicable to an unbounded continuous space. Hence if we say of something
that it exists or is situated “in” space, what we mean is that it is spatially extended, or that it is spatially
related to something else, or that it stands out from a spatial expanse like the visual image of a point.
3An accurate physical correlate of color sensations is given by the triplets of measurable quantities
known as “integrated reflectances” [6].
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color of the lagoon. One theorist who was acutely aware of this was Hermann Weyl [7,
p. 23]:
. . . it ought to be emphasized just how little mathematics can claim to
capture the phenomenal [anschauliche] nature of space: nothing in geometry
concerns what makes phenomenal space what it distinctively is. . . . Our
conceptual theories are capable of penetrating only one aspect of space, and
only the most superficial and formal at that.
A triplet of real numbers is not the same as a point. The difference between two
real numbers is not the same as the distance between two points. Distances possess,
in addition to their values, a purely qualitative aspect, and nobody lacking our pre-
mathematical grasp of phenomenal space is in a position to know it, anymore than Mary,
confined from birth to a black-and-white room, was in a position to know color [8].
It might be concluded that we should think of continuity in the same way as we
think of color sensations – as an appearance or a secondary quality, rather than as an
actual feature of the physical world: Continuity is a property of percepts and images in
phenomenal space; the real thing, physical space, is discrete and cardinally equal to R3.
However, in view of the interpretational difficulties associated with quantum mechanics,
it may be worth a try to consider the continuity we find in phenomenal space, and
the undifferentiated unity that goes with it, as objective features of the physical world,
and to determine how, this being so, the multiplicity of R3 and the distinctness of its
members relate to the physical world.
It is worth noting, to begin with, that if we conceive of physical space as a set of
points corresponding one-to-one to the members of R3, the individual points of space
are not visualizable. If we imagine a point, we imagine something that stands out from
an otherwise undifferentiated spatial expanse. If we think of this point as one of the
points of space, then this particular point of space possesses a quality that is not present
at those points of space that make up the surrounding expanse. Hence what we imagine
is not a point of space but this quality situated or instantiated at a particular point of
space. In other words, what we imagine is a pointlike object. We can visualize pointlike
objects, but we cannot visualize an individual point of space. The points of space are
not objects but nonvisualizable positions at which visualizable objects may be situated
or visualizable qualities may be instantiated.
Positions in phenomenal space can only be defined relatively, as spatial relations
that hold among visual percepts or images. We have neither empirical nor theoretical
reasons to doubt that the same is true of physical space: Positions are relatively defined,
as spatial relations that hold either among material objects or among the points of space.
The latter alternative, however, introduces into the physical world a spatial multiplicity
and a degree of spatial differentiation that not only are empirically unwarranted but
also violate the Identity of Indiscernibles, a principle of analytic ontology which says
that two things cannot have exactly the same properties. Since no objective differences
correspond to the differences between the triplets of real numbers by which we label the
points of space, these points have identical properties and therefore cannot be thought
of as distinct individuals.
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The points of space being positions at which material objects may be situated or
physical qualities may be instantiated, and positions being relatively defined, the points
of space are relatively defined. We do not have, on the one hand, a set of preexistent
positions (cardinally equal to the reals) and, on the other hand, a set of spatial relations
that hold among these positions. The positions are the spatial relations, or else they
are defined by them: The exist, as distinct locations, by virtue of the distinguishing
relations. The relata owe their existence to the relations, and the relations owe their
existence to the material objects or instantiated physical properties to which they are
attributable.
It follows that the synchronic multiplicity of the world does not go beyond the mul-
tiplicity of material objects (or locally instantiated physical properties4) existing at any
one time, and the multiplicity of their relations. It does not include the nondenumerable
multiplicity of the “points of space”. The function of this multiplicity – the multiplicity
of coordinates – is not to label “vacant” positions but to quantify the undifferentiated
spatial relations that exist between material objects. (The actually existing spatial rela-
tions, which spatially differentiate the world, are not themselves spatially differentiated.)
This is relationism, the doctrine that space is a family of spatial relations holding
among the world’s material constituents, rather than an additional constituent of the
world. The alternative to relationism is substantivalism. According to the latter, there
is such a thing as “space itself”, and this has, by itself, a definite number of dimensions
and a metric. The dimensionality of physical space, however, is fully determined by
the system of spatial relations that hold among material objects; it is the number of
coordinates needed to specify those relations. There is no need to attribute it to a
separate constituent of the world.
What about the metric? This too need not be attributed to a separate constituent
of the world. As was pointed out by Riemann [7, p. 101] [9, p. 752], unless physical
space is inherently discrete (and therefore a separate constituent of the world with
inherent properties), metric relations are extrinsic to it. On the relationist view of space,
metric relations exist only between material objects, and the assignment of values to
such relations is based on the behavior of material objects, rather than on properties
intrinsic to space. Since the behavior of material objects finds formal expression in laws
that make reference to distances, it is possible that the metric properties of the world and
the laws of physics are individually underdetermined. What is observable, or factual,
is the behavior of material objects. To describe it, we use both a metric and a set of
dynamical laws, neither of which is separately observable. Hence, in principle, the same
behavior is describable in relation to different metrization schemes, by alternative sets
of physical laws. This means that the metric properties of the world are partly based on
a conventional choice between alternative sets of laws, as was stressed by Poincare´ [10].5
If we embrace relationism, we cannot attribute continuity to physical space as if
this were a separate constituent of the world – a three-dimensional expanse existing
independently of its material “content”. If there is anything in the physical world to
4The qualifier “locally instantiated” does not imply that locations exist in advance of instantiation.
5Arguably, the specific lawful behavior responsible for the metric properties of the world consists in
the invariant periodicities that are associated with the inertial masses of particles [11, 12].
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which we can attribute the continuity that we find in phenomenal space, it is the spatial
relations that exist between material objects. (As the following section will show, it is not
necessary to attribute continuity separately to the forms of spatially extended objects,
for such forms are simply sets of spatial relations.) Moreover, since the synchronic
multiplicity of the world is limited to the multiplicity of material objects existing at any
one time and the multiplicity of their relations, each relation possesses not only this
continuity but also the unity of an undifferentiated line segment.
Let me amplify. Given Cartesian coordinates, the spatial relation between two ma-
terial objects A and B is essentially the distance D(AB) between A and B. D(AB) is
quantitatively determined by the algebraic differences between the coordinates of A and
B. But the distances between material objects also have a qualitative character. They
are not just numbers; they are spatial. We tend to think of D(AB) as a quantity, and
we tend to attribute to this “quantity” the multiplicity of some interval of the so-called
“real line”. That is, we tend to take it for granted that there are as many places between
the two objects as there are real numbers between 0 and d(AB), the value of D(AB). In
reality there are as many places in the material world as there are material objects. The
places at which objects may be located do not actually exist unless objects are actually
located there. Thus if we consider the distance D(AB), we are looking at something
that possesses the quality of spatial extension as well as a value d(AB), but that is
destitute of multiplicity. Unless there are other, appropriately situated objects, there
are no places between A and B.
It thus is a mistake to think of D(AB) as intrinsically multiple. There is no multi-
plicity that would qualify as inherent in a single spatial relation. There are no points or
places between A and B unless other material objects are situated between A and B. It
takes a third object C to introduce another two distances D(AC) and D(CB) such that
d(AB) = d(AC) + d(CB). The same equation does not hold among the three distances
D(AB), D(AC) and D(CB). None of these distances is the sum of anything. D(AB)
is not a quantity that is “made up” of quantities; it is a relation that possesses (i) the
qualitative property of undifferentiated continuous extension and (ii) the value d(AB).
It interposes no places between A and B. If anything interposes a location between the
location of A and the location of B, it is another material object C.
To thinkers from Aristotle to Kant and Gauss it appeared self-evident that points
on a line are extrinsic to the line, in the sense that they are additional features not
contained in its image. They considered the line itself and, by implication, space itself
is an inherently undivided “whole” existing in an anterior relationship to limits and
divisions. “Space is essentially one”, Kant wrote [13, p. 25], “the manifold in it. . .
arises entirely from the introduction of limits.” Kant was right in saying that what is
continuous is intrinsically one. But he was wrong in attributing the world’s synchronic
multiplicity to the introduction of limits. Synchronic multiplicity owes its reality to
the spatial relations that exist between objects. Therefore there exists no such tension
of contrast as that between the unity of a three-dimensional continuous expanse and
a multiplicity of divisions that somehow appear in it. Continuity and unity are not
properties of “space itself” but pertain to (are instantiated with) each spatial relation
between a pair of material objects. The continuous unity of D(AB) thus in no way
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conflicts with the spatial multiplicity of the world, for the former belongs to each spatial
relation while the latter belongs to the totality of spatial relations that exist in the
world.
We have assumed the existence of Cartesian coordinates. Since the central purpose
of this article is to find a way of thinking about the world’s actual multiplicity that is
consistent with quantum mechanics (or a way of thinking about quantum mechanics
that is consistent with the world’s actual multiplicity), this assumption is justified by
the fact that quantum mechanics presupposes the use of Cartesian coordinates. Specifi-
cally, every quantization scheme that leads to Hilbert space vectors and Weyl operators
presupposes the “flat” metric that goes with Cartesian coordinates [14, 15, 16].6 To see
why this should be so, we must bear in mind that in quantum mechanics coordinates do
not represent positions but values that are available for attribution to the positions of
material objects. Since these positions are relative positions, a useful coordinate system
has to be riveted to some material object (e.g., the nucleus of an atom, the center of
mass of a composite object, a macroscopic part of a macroscopic apparatus). A co-
ordinate system CA riveted to a given object A represents the “space” of values that
are potentially attributable to the positions of objects Bi relative to A, but it does not
represent the “space” of values that are potentially attributable to the positions of the
objects Bi relative to each other. The appropriate value “space” for the positions of the
objects Bi, i ≥ 0, relative to B = B0 is not CA but CB .
This would be of no consequence if the relative positions of material objects had
definite values, for then CB could be obtained by simply translating (and maybe ro-
tating) CA. But since the relative position of each pair of material objects is to some
extent “fuzzy” – a notion that will be substantiated and made precise in what follows, –
there isn’t any point transformation that takes us from CA to CB . It follows that the
coordinate “space” presupposed by quantum mechanics can have nothing to do with
curvature. This “space” of attributable values is always riveted to a single material
object A, whereas a test for curvature involves at least two different, not determinately
related, value “spaces”. (To detect curvature near A, one needs to know not only the
positions of nearby objects Bi relative to A but also the positions of the objects Bi rel-
ative to each other.) Each individual value “space” is therefore necessarily and trivially
flat.
In this section arguments supporting the following notions have been presented:
• Physical space is not a set of point individuals but a system of spatial relations
that hold among material objects.
• Like the sensation of turquoise, continuous extension is a qualitative feature of our
visual percepts. Unlike that sensation, it is an objective feature of the physical
world (that is, it is an objective feature of every spatial relation).
6“This assumption [of replacing classical canonical coordinates by corresponding operators] is found
in practice to be successful only when applied to the dynamical coordinates and momenta referring to
a Cartesian system of axes and not to more general curvilinear coordinates” – Dirac [17, p. 114].
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• The relative position of any pair of material objects (or the distance between
the two objects) lacks multiplicity; it possesses the quality of continuous spatial
extension (in one dimension) and the undifferentiated unity of an unsegmented
line in phenomenal space.
• The spatial multiplicity of the world is the multiplicity of spatial relations that
hold among material objects. It is not due to the introduction of boundaries.
• A clear distinction has to be made between physical space and the set R3 of values
that are potentially attributable to the relative positions of material objects. The
quality of continuous spatial extension is not attributable to this set, nor is the
concept of curvature applicable to it.
As will become clear in what follows, the conceptual framework staked out so far is
eminently suited to the task at hand – making sense of quantum mechanics.
3 Are Fundamental Particles Pointlike?
The Ontology of Synchronic Multiplicity
Let us now take account of the relevant empirical findings. We begin with the existence
of simple or noncomposite entities, which we will refer to as “fundamental particles”.
According to the current standard model of elementary particle physics, the particles
that are fundamental are the quarks and the leptons, but all we need to know or assume
at this point is that noncomposite objects exist. Combined with the conclusions reached
in the previous section, this warrants the following claims:
• Any composite material object (with the possible exception of the universe as a
whole) is made up of a finite number of fundamental particles and the spatial
relations that hold among them. To the particles it owes its finite multiplicity; to
the spatial relations it owes its spatial extension.
• There are not two kinds of spatially extended things, such as regions of space and
a material stuff that occupies or fills them. The only kind of spatial extension in
existence is the spatial extension that is attributable to possessed spatial relations.
There is no material stuff that occupies or fills space. What is spatially extended
either is a spatial relation or has spatial relations among its constituents. A com-
posite object “occupies” space only in the sense that it is partly constituted by
the spatial relations between its material constituents.
• There are not two kinds of synchronic multiplicity, such as a multiplicity of material
things and a multiplicity of self-existing locations. There is only the multiplicity of
fundamental particles and the multiplicity of their spatial relations. The actually
existing locations are the (relatively defined) positions that are attributable to
fundamental particles and composites thereof.
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In respect of any given object O, one may distinguish two kinds of spatial relations:
those internal to O, which hold between its material constituents, and those external to
O, which hold between O or its material constituents and objects having no constituents
in common with O. By definition, a fundamental particle lacks internal spatial relations.
In the minds of most physicists an object lacking internal spatial relations is pointlike,
but such an object may just as well be formless. It must be emphasized that there can
be no direct evidence of either the formlessness or the pointlike form of a fundamental
particle.7 What can be experimentally ascertained about a specific type of particle is the
absence of evidence of internal structure. If absence of evidence is interpreted as evidence
of absence – the standard model does this in respect of the quarks and the leptons, –
this may be construed either as the possession of a pointlike form or as the nonexistence
of any form. On the latter view, the forms of all the beasts and baubles in this world
resolve themselves into the spatial relations that obtain among their constituent parts.
Ultimate parts have no parts, so they also have no form. On the former view there
exists, in addition to the forms that resolve themselves into spatial relations, another
type of spatial form, namely the pointlike form of a fundamental particle. It is obvious
which is the more parsimonious view.
There are further reasons for rejecting the notion that a fundamental particle has
a pointlike form, besides the empirical inaccessibility of such a form and Occam’s prin-
ciple of theoretical parsimony. Since space is not a storehouse of preexistent positions,
positions need to be realized or brought into being. They may be realized individually
– by the presence of a material object with (ideally) the form of a point – or they may
be realized in pairs, as relative positions. But if they are realized individually, we still
need to specify quantitatively how they are related to each other. A single object or
locally instantiated property can define “here” qualitatively, but it is not enough to
quantify (attribute a numerical value to) “here”. For this purpose we need to know how
“here” is quantitatively related to “elsewhere”. And this is all we need to know. For the
quantitative purposes of physics, the existence of position-marking forms is irrelevant.
Why then should Nature go to the trouble of investing the ultimate spatial relata with
(pointlike) forms, when it is enough to realize positions in pairs, as spatial relations?
The fact that in the phenomenal world we do not and cannot encounter formless entities
is no argument. As we shall see in Sec. 10, this is a consequence of the neurophysiological
basis of the phenomenal world, and thus has no bearing on the nature of the physical
world.
Attributing to a fundamental particle the form of a point is not only gratuitous
but also inconsistent with the relationist conception of space. To see this, consider a
world that contains a single fundamental particle. If this had a pointlike form, then
there would exist, in addition to the particle, a surrounding spatial expanse. But if the
spatial aspect of the world is a family of spatial relations between material objects, all
that is spatially extended is the spatial relations between material objects. A world
that contains a single fundamental particle contains no spatial relations, and therefore
7There is indirect evidence: As is shown in this section, the formlessness is entailed by the relationist
conception of space, which in turn is entailed by the behavior of electrons in two-slit experiments, as I
shall argue in Sec. 5.
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it contains nothing that is spatially extended. There is no surrounding spatial expanse.
And so there is no pointlike form either, as this implies the existence of such an expanse.
I think it is high time that we recognize the notion that a fundamental particle has a
(pointlike) form for what it is – an unwarranted importation from the phenomenal world
into the world of physics. In the phenomenal world, the existence of spatial relations
presupposes the existence of spatially related forms (visual percepts or images) to which
the spatial relations are attributable. Forms are phenomenologically prior to spatial
relations. In the physical world the converse is true. Spatial relations are ontologically
prior to forms. The form of an object O is the set of O’s internal spatial relations. A
noncomposite object lacks internal relations. Hence “the form of a noncomposite object”
is a contradiction in terms.
In the days when an atom was still largely thought of as a miniature solar system,
Werner Heisenberg, if I remember rightly, argued that if atoms are to explain what the
phenomenal world looks like, they cannot look like anything in the phenomenal world
– an insight that we haven’t fully assimilated yet. In the phenomenal world, in which
objects are bundles of qualia, every object necessarily has a form. If the same were true
of the physical world, a noncomposite object would have to be pointlike. But the stuff
that the physical world is made of is very different from qualia. The physical world is
made of formless particles and the spatial relations that hold among them.
Let us complete the list of points made in this section:
• Spatial forms are sets of spatial relations. A composite object possesses both a
position (consisting in its external spatial relations) and a form (consisting of its
internal spatial relations). An object that lacks internal spatial relations also lacks
a form.
4 The Identity of Fundamental Particles
In what way does a material object O differ from its form? What does O possess in
excess of the spatial relations that make up its form? The obvious answer is, the formless
entities to which we attribute those spatial relations. And what is it that these entities
contribute to O over and above their spatial relations? The obvious answer is, existence
pure and simple. The difference between a set F of spatial relations and a material
object O whose internal spatial relations make up F is that O exists while F by itself
does not. What O has in excess of its form is the existence that its formless material
constituents bestow on its internal spatial relations.
An actually existing composite object A possesses other properties besides the prop-
erty of existence. A composite object therefore is something to which existence is contin-
gently attributable; an object with the properties of A may or may not exist. A relative
position is likewise definable independently of its existence, so it, too, may or may not
exist. A fundamental particle, on the other hand, is not something to which existence is
contingently attributable. Divested of its external spatial relations and the dynamical
parameters that contribute to determine the evolution of these relations,8 a fundamental
8Fundamental particles are usually thought of as possessing “by themselves” a mass, a spin, and
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Figure 1: Scattering of two particles at right angles. If the alternative processes on the
left-hand side of this symbolic equation are distinguishable experimentally, the equa-
tion holds for probabilities. In this case the diagram on the right-hand side gives an
incomplete picture of what actually happens. If the alternative processes are indistin-
guishable experimentally, the equation holds for amplitudes. In this case the diagram
on the right-hand side gives the complete picture of what actually happens, while the
diagrams on the left-hand side are overcomplete: They involve a distinction that Nature
doesn’t make.
particle has nothing but the property of existence. Hence it cannot be defined indepen-
dently of its existence. If we abstract from external relations and dynamical parameters,
there is nothing left to which existence is contingently attributable. All that is left is
“existence itself”. A fundamental particle, therefore, either is “existence itself” or is an
instance of “existence itself”.
So which is it – “existence itself” or an instance of it? The answer is an unequivocal
“both”. To arrive at this conclusion, we will have to take account of another empirical
finding. Let us consider a scattering experiment with particles of the same type –
say, two protons. Let us assume that there are two incoming particles, one (N) moving
northwards and one (S) moving southwards, and two outgoing particles, one (E) moving
eastwards and one (W ) moving westwards. Anyone unfamiliar with quantum mechanics
will expect the following to be the case: either N is the same particle as W and S is
the same particle as E, or N is the same particle as E and S is the same particle as
W . Yet nothing could be further from the truth. Quantum mechanics tells us in no
uncertain terms that neither of the incoming particles is identical with either of the
outgoing particles.
One arrives at this conclusion by considering the probability p (E,W ) of the assumed
final state (one eastbound particle and one westbound particle), given the assumed initial
state. If the particles are of different types – say, a proton and a neutron in, a proton
and a neutron out – p (E,W ) is the sum of two probabilities, the probability that N is
various types of charge. These properties, however, are more appropriately understood as dynamical
parameters characteristic of the evolution of spatial relations, rather than as intrinsic properties of
individual particles. They tell us nothing about what a particle is in itself, or how it behaves out of
relation to other particles.
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the same particle as E and S is the same particle as W , and the probability that N is
the same particle as W and S is the same particle as E, in agreement with the dictates
of common sense:
pc(E,W ) = |〈EW |NS〉|
2 + |〈WE|NS〉|2.
〈EW |NS〉 and 〈WE|NS〉 are the respective probability amplitudes associated with the
alternatives (N → E, S → W ) and (N → W , S → E), in obvious notation. The two
possibilities that contribute to p (E,W ) are illustrated in Fig. 1. If the particles are of
the same type, the probability for scattering at right angles is given by
p (E,W ) = |〈EW |NS〉+ 〈WE|NS〉|2.
For bosons 〈EW |NS〉 = +〈WE|NS〉, and p (E,W ) is twice as large as pc(E,W ):
pb(E,W ) = |2〈EW |NS〉|
2 = 4|〈EW |NS〉|2 = 2pc(E,W ).
For fermions 〈EW |NS〉 = −〈WE|NS〉, and pf (E,W ) = 0. Both results are inconsistent
with the notion that the two particles possess permanent identities. A fortiori they are
inconsistent with the idea that a particle possesses the property of “being this very
particle”, known to philosophers as “thisness” or “haecceity”.
Before and after the scattering, the two particles possess distinguishing characteris-
tics: They travel in opposite directions, and they are in different places (relative to the
laboratory frame). But at the time of scattering no such distinguishing characteristics
exist, nor is it possible to causally link a particular incoming particle to a particular
outgoing particle, nor can there be anything (such as thisness) that makes up for the
missing causal identifiers. All of this follows from the experimentally confirmed scatter-
ing probabilities predicted by quantum mechanics. How many things, then, exist at the
time of scattering? Two absolutely indistinguishable things? Or a single thing with the
capacity for twofold instantiation?
According to the Identity of Indiscernibles, there cannot be two absolutely indis-
tinguishable things. Seen from the laboratory frame, the two particles are absolutely
indistinguishable at the time of scattering. In particular, their positions relative to the
laboratory frame are identical.9 In spite of this, however, the two particles remain in
possession of a nontrivial relative position, and this is sufficient for them to be two things
even at the time of scattering. By a “nontrivial relative position” I mean a relative po-
sition that is not equivalent to an exactly vanishing distance. (Owing to the fuzziness of
all possessed relative positions, no relative position is trivial in this sense.) The existence
of a relation implies the existence of two relata. The spatial relation that exists between
the two particles thus warrants their twoness without making them discernible in the
laboratory frame. This permits either of two conclusions. If we consider the possession
of distinguishing properties relative to the laboratory frame necessary for the discerni-
bility of the two particles, then at the time of scattering there exist two indiscernible
9If particles were impenetrable bits of stuff, it would be impossible for them to have identical positions.
But formless entities obviously can have identical positions relative to a reference object or frame, and
this is equally true of objects that are made up of formless entities.
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Figure 2: Same as Fig. 1, except for the possibility of type swapping. Since the alter-
native processes on the left-hand side (with and without type swapping) are indistin-
guishable experimentally, the diagram on the right-hand side gives the complete picture
of what actually happens, while the diagrams on the left-hand side again involve a
distinction that Nature doesn’t make.
particles, and the Identity of Indiscernibles fails. If on the other hand we consider the
existence of a not exactly vanishing distance between the two particles sufficient for their
being discernible, then all particles are discernible, and the principle holds.
In either case, the reason why the two particles at the time of scattering are two
things is their nontrivial spatial relation. Hence intrinsically (that is, considered out of
relation to each other) the two particles are not two things. They are identical, and this
not in the weak sense of exact similarity but in the strong sense of numerical identity.
Hence the unequivocal “both”: Intrinsically (out of relation to each other) either particle
is “existence itself”, and extrinsically (that is, by virtue of the spatial relation between
them), they are two instances of “existence itself”.
What has been established so far is that particles of the same type, considered out
of relation to each other, are numerically identical. If type conversions are possible,
this conclusion can be extended to particles of different types. Suppose that the two
particles in our scattering experiment are of different types (e.g., a proton and a neutron
in, a proton and a neutron out) but that particles of the first type can be converted into
particles of the second type (a proton into a neutron and vice versa). Further suppose
that N and E are of type 1, and that S and W are of type 2. Then the probability of
this scattering event is given by
p (E1,W2) = |〈E1W2|N1S2〉+ 〈W2E1|N1S2〉|
2
,
where the indices specify the types to which the incoming and outgoing particles belong.
Once again it is impossible to say whether a particular incoming particle is the same as
or different from a particular outgoing particle. And the reason this is so is not that
we have no means of knowing which of the alternatives depicted in Fig. 2 represents
what actually happens. The reason this is so is that the distinction we make between
the alternatives is a distinction that Nature does not make. Nothing in the physical
world corresponds to the conceptual difference between these alternatives. It would
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therefore be incorrect to interpret the specified scattering event by affirming that the
particles scatter both with and without type swapping, and it would be equally incorrect
to interpret it by affirming that the particles scatter neither with nor without type
swapping. Both interpretations involve a conceptual distinction that Nature does not
make. That distinction exists solely in our minds.10
The same argument that took us from p (E,W ) to the numerical identity of par-
ticles of the same type (considered out of relation to each other), now takes us from
p (E1,W2) to the numerical identity of all particles of the same basic type (considered
out of relation to each other). What is characteristic of a basic particle species is that
its members cannot be converted into members of a different basic species. How many
basic types of particle exist depends on the theory. According to the standard model, a
member of one of the two species of particles known respectively as hadrons and leptons
cannot be converted into a member of the other species (the same applies to bosons
and fermions), while in the so-called grand unified theories hadrons and leptons are mu-
tually convertible, and in supersymmetric theories “once a fermion, always a fermion”
is no longer true either. In these theories, being a hadron, lepton, boson, or fermion
is an accidental property of something that by itself is neither hadron nor lepton nor
boson nor fermion; there exists just one basic type of particle. But whether or not the
final theory (assuming that there will be one) permits conversions between all particle
types, the property of belonging to a particular type of particle can be thought of as
accidental or contingent, and all existing fundamental particles can be thought of as
being intrinsically one and the same entity – “existence itself”.
Moreover, as was pointed out in note 8, particle species are distinguished by what
is essentially a set of dynamical parameters governing the evolution of spatial relations.
As attributes of an individual particle, considered out of relation to other particles,
these parameters are meaningless. Hence if we consider a fundamental particle as it
is in itself, we must mentally strip it not only of its spatial relations but also of the
type to which it belongs. This too entails that intrinsically all fundamental particles
are identical in the strongest possible sense: But for their spatial relations, they are
one and the same entity. The basic reality of matter, accordingly, is not a multitude of
fundamental particles but a single entity, and this entity cannot be qualified as anything
more particular or determinate than “existence itself”. Henceforth I shall omit the coy
quotation marks and represent this entity by the symbol E .
A fundamental particle is not just like E ; each fundamental particle is E . At bottom
the world has exactly one fundamental material constituent, namely E . The individu-
ation or multiple instantiation of E is a consequence of the realization, or the coming
into existence, of spatial relations. E has the capacity to enter into spatial relations
with itself, and this is what gives it the aspect of a multitude of relata. But what exists
at either end of each spatial relation, considered in itself, is identically the same entity
E . At bottom all there is is E and spatial relations between E and itself. The spatial
relations owe their existence to E – they exist because they are relational determinations
10As my aim here is to make sense of standard quantum mechanics, I take the nonexistence of hidden
variables for granted. This warrants the logical step from a set of interfering alternatives to the objective
unreality of whatever it is that renders the alternatives distinct to our minds.
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of E , – and E owes its individuation or multiple instantiation to the existence of spatial
relations: A multiplicity of relations implies a multiplicity of relata, even if intrinsically
each relatum – each fundamental particle of matter – is E .
Instantiation is traditionally conceived as running parallel to predication: What
gets instantiated is a predicable universal; the resulting instance is an impredicable
individual. This way of thinking suggests that what is responsible for the instantiation
is something that is present in the individual but absent from the universal, and this
idea is at the root of the Platonic-Aristotelian dualism of Matter and Form and its
subsequent transformations, including the idea that physical qualities are instantiated
by the “points of space”. The individuation that takes us from E to the fundamental
particles of matter is something else altogether. A fundamental particle is not two
things – (i) instantiated existence and (ii) something (such as a “point of space” or
a part of Plato’s matter-space) that does the instantiating. In a fundamental particle
there isn’t anything that is distinct from E and of which existence is predicable. There
is nothing that acquires “E-ness” the way a bounded portion of Platonic-Aristotelian
matter acquires Being or actuality. There is nothing present in a fundamental particle
that is absent from E .
Only existence can instantiate existence, for an effective instantiator must exist in
advance of the instantiation, and the only “thing” that exists in advance of the in-
stantiation of E is E . But this is the same as saying that the only way to instantiate
existence is to relate it to itself. Only in this way can the proper logical dependences be
implemented: The instances of existence exist because the instantiating spatial relations
exist; the instantiating relations exist because they are properties of E (or because E
has assumed them, or because E has entered into spatial relations with itself); and E
exists because it is “the one independent reality of which all things are an expression”
(a dictionary definition of “the absolute” [18]).
The relationship between E and its instances thus is as close and as intelligible as
can be. It is not some mystical relation between formless Matter and immaterial Form.
It is identity plain and simple. The spatial multiplicity of the world is not based on
something that is intrinsically multiple like Plato’s matter or a set of point-individuals
with the cardinality of the reals. It is a multiplicity of relations that entails a multiplicity
of relata. But only the relata qua relata are many. Intrinsically (out of relation to other
particles) each relatum is E . The “expression” of the one independent reality E is
effected by means of relations between E and itself. Physical properties are relational
– they are either spatial relations or dynamical parameters governing the evolution of
spatial relations, – and since existence is contingently attributable to them, they may
be thought of as universals. But E cannot be thought of as another universal. Material
things are made of relations, and these owe their existence not to a predicable universal
but to the existence that they relate.
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5 The Heart of Quantum Mechanics
In the previous section we addressed the “the miraculous identity of particles of the same
type”, which Misner et al. [19, p. 1215] regard as “a central mystery of physics”. In
this section we examine a phenomenon which according to Feynman et al. [20, Sec. 1–1]
“has in it the heart of quantum mechanics”.
Let R be some bounded spatial region. We tend to think that the world can be
divided into things or parts that are inside R and things or parts that are outside R.
We tend to think that spatial distinctions like the distinction between the inside of R
and the outside of R are real per se, and that a fortiori they are real for everything that
exists in space. If this were the correct way of thinking about space, any object O would
at any time satisfy one of the following three conditions: (i) O is wholly inside R; (ii) O
is wholly outside R; (iii) O has two parts, one inside R and one outside R. Once again
reality does not comply with the dictates of common sense. Quantum mechanics tells
us in no uncertain terms that sometimes all of these propositions are false.
The paradigm example is a two-slit interference experiment with electrons [20,
Chap. 1]. Anyone unfamiliar with quantum mechanics expects one of the following
propositions to be true of each electron: (i) it goes through the first slit, (ii) it goes
through the second slit, (iii) it consists of parts that go through different slits. Yet
whenever the experimental arrangement is such that interference fringes are observed,
the electron does none of this. It doesn’t go through a particular slit,11 and it doesn’t
get divided by its passage through the slits. Albert [23, p. 11] draws from this the
conclusion that “[e]lectrons seem to have modes of being, or modes of moving, available
to them which are quite unlike what we know how to think about”.
The behavior of electrons becomes intelligible if we reject the substantival, set-
theoretic conception of physical space. The three propositions just considered are based
on the assumption that the two slits are distinct per se. One of the things that the
interference fringes are trying to tell us is that our conceptual distinction between the
regions defined by the slits does not exist for the electron. Hence the distinction cannot
be real per se. In other words, it cannot be intrinsic to space. Hence the substantival,
set-theoretic conception of physical space, which entails the distinction, cannot be the
right way of thinking about physical space.
The electron is able to go through the two slits indiscriminately (that is, without go-
ing through a particular slit and without being divided) because the conceptual distinc-
tion between “disjoint parts of space” (which is inherent in the set-theoretic conception
of space) does not always correspond to something that is physically real. When it is
appropriate to add amplitudes rather than probabilities,12 the distinction we make be-
11There is nothing so obvious that a philosopher cannot be found to deny it, as Lockwood [21, p. 45]
observed. It seems to be the same with physicists. Bohmian mechanics [22] tries to salvage as much
of common sense as is consistent with the empirical data, by attributing to each particle a definite
but observationally meaningless position. By introducing unobservable (and hence arbitrary) causes for
stochastic events, this theory makes each electron go through a definite slit.
12As will become clear in the next section, this is the case when the following two conditions are
fulfilled: (i) There isn’t any matter of fact about the alternative taken, and (ii) the quantum system
under consideration, S1, is not correlated (“entangled”) with another quantum system S2 in such a way
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tween the corresponding alternatives is a distinction that Nature does not make. We can
say that the electron went through both slits if “both slits” stands for a single positional
attribute – the opening made up of the two slits. But we cannot make this equivalent
to two propositions (“the electron went through the first slit” and “the electron went
through the second slit”) since this involves a distinction that has no counterpart in the
physical world. The distinction exists solely in our minds. But if a distinction exists
solely in our minds, the same is true of any notion that implies the distinction. The
notion which makes the two alternatives in a two-slit experiment distinct for us, and the
behavior of electrons incomprehensible, is the notion that physical space is intrinsically
and infinitely differentiated. The notion that the multiplicity of R3 is inherent in phys-
ical space (and that, consequently, the individual points of space or space-time can be
regarded as carriers of physical properties) is as inconsistent with quantum mechanics
as the notion of absolute simultaneity is with special relativity. This notion perhaps
more than any other is what prevents us from making sense of quantum mechanics.
If space were an intrinsically and infinitely differentiated constituent of the physical
world, then any spatial region, however small, would per se be distinct from any other
(disjoint) spatial region, and every material object O would consist of as many spatial
parts as the space it occupies. The parts of space would define the parts of O. If O has
only a finite number of material constituents, these would necessarily be pointlike, and
for any partition {d3R} of space into infinitesimal regions the following would necessarily
be the case: Each of the material constituents of O is located inside a particular region
d3R. In other words, on a substantival, set-theoretic account of physical space, the
positions of things are necessarily definite. In reality – so the behavior of the electrons
tells us – space is a system of spatial relations between material objects, and these spatial
relations are (more or less) indefinite. The behavior of electrons in two-slit interference
experiments is Nature’s corroboration of the relationist conception of physical space
developed in Secs. 2 and 3.
Such an experiment typically features several macroscopic objects like an electron
gun (a heated tungsten wire in a metal box with a hole, the wire being at a negative
voltage with respect to the box), a thin metal plate with two slits in it, and an array
of detectors (Geiger counters or electron multipliers connected to loudspeakers). What
these objects have in common is that their relative positions can be treated as definite.13
The only objects with pertinently indefinite positions (relative to any macroscopic part
of the apparatus) are the electrons coming from the electron gun. We tend to visualize
the position P of such an electron (relative to the apparatus) as a cloud or a smudge (a
“wave packet” or, worse, two “wave packets”). It is important to understand that this
picture cannot be taken to represent a state of affairs in physical space. The “space”
that inferences to the alternative taken by S1 could be drawn from future measurements performed on
S2.
13Why this so is explained in Sec. 7. Sometimes an exception is made for the slit plate. If the
transverse momentum of the slit plate is so sharp that by measuring it one can infer the slit taken by
the electron, the positional indefiniteness of the slit plate (relative to the rest of the apparatus) rules
out the existence of an interference pattern [20, Sec. 1–8]. The correct explanation of the obliteration
of the interference pattern, however, is not the positional indefiniteness of the slit plate but the ensuing
correlation of the transverse momentum of the slit plate with the transverse position of the electron.
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containing the cloud is the set C of values that are available for attribution to the relative
position P. This value “space” must not be conflated with the physical space S, which
contains P. It is a set of triplets of real numbers. It does not possess the quality of
spatial extension known to us from percepts and images in phenomenal space. Outside
of phenomenal space, this quality is attributable solely to the possessed spatial relations
that make up S.
The “point of contact” between C and S is detectors. By a “detector” I mean
anything that is capable of indicating the presence of a material object, such as an
electron, in a particular spatial region Ri, or its passing through a particular section
σi of a plane. The regions Ri or the sections σi are physically realized or realizable
with the help of macroscopic boundaries (that is, boundaries made up of a large number
of material constituents the spatial relations between which can be treated as definite).
These regions or sections define values (“inside Ri” or “through σi”) that are potentially
attributable to P. They therefore “exist” both in S and in C. But only if a detector
clicks (that is, only if there is a matter of fact about the particular region containing
the electron or the particular section crossed by the electron) is the corresponding value
actually attributable to P, as will become clear in what follows.
If the substantival, set-theoretic conception of physical space is inconsistent with
quantum mechanics, so is the doctrine called local realism, according to which, “. . .
all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one
little thing and then another. . . . We have geometry: a system of external relations of
spatiotemporal distance between points. . . . And at those points we have local qualities:
perfectly natural intrinsic properties which need nothing bigger than a point at which
to be instantiated. . . . And that is all. . . . All else supervenes on that” [24, p. X]. What
quantum mechanics is trying to tell us is that reality is not built “from the bottom up”,
on an infinitely and intrinsically differentiated space, out of locally instantiated physical
properties. There are no points on which a world of such properties can be built. Reality
instead is built “from the top down”: By assuming a multitude of spatial relations, E
takes on not only the aspect of a spatially differentiated world but also the aspect of a
multiplicity of fundamental particles.
If the doctrine of local realism is an exploded myth, so is the principle of local action
(a.k.a. local causality), according to which the “local matters of particular fact” at a
point x are influenced only by the “local matters of particular fact” in the infinitesimal
neighborhood of x. Local action therefore cannot be the solution to the perceived
problem of action at a distance. Nor does this require a solution, since it is a pseudo-
problem arising from erroneous assumptions. For one thing, it presupposes the existence
of separate interacting entities A and B, as well as the existence of separate regions
of space containing A and B. But A and B aren’t separate entities, nor are there
separate regions of space. If A and B are fundamental particles, they both are E , and
if they are composite objects, the ultimate material constituents of A are numerically
identical with the ultimate material constituents of B. Physical space, on the other
hand, isn’t something that by itself has parts; it is a system of spatial relations between
material objects. The spatial differentiation of the physical world is a property of its
material content, not of a substantivally conceived space. Two locations are therefore
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never separate “by themselves”. Only material objects can be spatially separated, and
for two objects A and B to be spatially separated, it is necessary that their relative
position P(A,B) is sufficiently large compared to its indefiniteness. But this is not
enough: The position of B relative to A, as seen from the laboratory frame, PL(A,B) =
P(B,L) − P(A,L), must likewise be sufficiently large compared to its indefiniteness.14
The following often cited statement [25] is therefore unfounded: “An essential aspect of
[the] arrangement of things in physics is that they lay claim, at a certain time, to an
existence independent of one another, provided these objects ‘are situated in different
parts of space’ ”. There are no “different parts of space”.
For another thing, the very attempt to explain (causally or otherwise) the fundamen-
tal behavior of matter appears misconceived. Explanation begins with the fundamental
behavior of matter, which can only be described, and which in part is described by quan-
tum mechanics. We have space, which is a system of relations between E and itself. In
classical physics we have dynamical laws, which spell out how these relations evolve in
time. In quantum physics we have mathematical condensations of statistical regular-
ities. The idea that particles act on particles, or that the distribution and motion of
matter “here” and “now” is causally related to the distribution and motion of matter
“there” and “then”, or that measurement results are so related, adds nothing of physical
significance to (classical) laws that simply describe how spatial relations are temporally
related, or to (quantum-mechanical) laws that, as will become clear in what follows,
describe statistical correlations between property-indicating facts. And specifically, any
attempt to explain the statistical regularities in terms of causal strings that criss-cross
space or space-time involves the principle of local action and therefore is inconsistent
with quantum mechanics.
6 Quantum-Mechanical Properties Are Extrinsic
Quantum mechanics is, if nothing else, a tool for calculating probabilities. It represents
the possible values qki of observables Q
k as projection operators PQk=qk
i
on some Hilbert
space H. The projection operators that jointly represent the range of possible values of
a given observable are mutually orthogonal. If one defines the “state” of a system as
a probability measure on the projection operators on H resulting from a preparation of
the system [26][27, p. 92–94], one finds [26, 28][27, p. 132] that every such probability
measure has the form p (P) = Tr(WP), where W is a unique density operator [that
is, a unique self-adjoint, positive operator satisfying Tr(W) = 1 and W2 ≤ W]. Tr
signifies the trace defined by the formula Tr(X) :=
∑
i〈i|X|i〉 for any orthonormal basis
{|i〉}. If W2(t) = W(t), W(t) projects on a one-dimensional subspace of H and thus is
14L marks the origin of the laboratory frame. While P(A,B) corresponds to a single conditional
probability distribution – the distribution of P(B,L) conditional on A’s having a numerically exact
position in the laboratory frame, – PL(A,B) corresponds to the difference between the distributions
of P(B,L) and P(A,L). (A word of caution: As we shall see below, the probabilities that one may
use to quantitatively describe indefinite relative positions are distributed over counterfactuals. This
rules out naive realistic interpretations of position probability distributions and wave functions, such as
Schro¨dinger’s original interpretation of ψ as some bizarre kind of real jelly.)
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equivalent – apart from an irrelevant phase factor – to a state vector |ψ(t)〉 or a wave
function ψ(r, t), r being any point in the system’s configuration space.
It is tempting to attribute the truth of quantum-mechanical probability assignments
to an underlying state of affairs. It is equally tempting to assume that this state of affairs
is somehow represented by the state vector or the density operator. Instead of jumping
to such conclusions, however, one should heed van Kampen’s [29] warning: “Whoever
endows ψ with more meaning than is needed for computing observable phenomena is
responsible for the consequences. . . .” One should not lose sight of the fact that the state
vector or the density operator is what one gets if one defines the “state” of a system as
a probability measure on the projection operators representing the possible properties
of the system. The idea that what by definition is a tool for assigning probabilities to
possibilities also describes an actual state of affairs, is simply a category mistake.
Quantummechanics being inconsistent with local realism, it is impossible to interpret
ψ(r, t) as a local quality – something that “need[s] nothing bigger than a point at which
to be instantiated”. The fact that we live in a relativistic world, moreover, commits
us to treating time and space on an equal footing, as far as this is consistent with
the obvious qualitative differences between the two. Specifically, if space is a system
of spatial relations, then time is a system of temporal relations (or, rather, then space-
time is a system of spatiotemporal relations), and if space isn’t intrinsically and infinitely
differentiated (or, rather, if the world isn’t infinitely differentiated spacewise), then time
isn’t intrinsically and infinitely differentiated either (that is, the world isn’t infinitely
differentiated timewise). In other words, if space isn’t a set of self-existent points, time
can’t be a set of self-existent instants. Hence ψ(r, t) not only isn’t something that exists
at “the point r” but also isn’t something that exists at “the instant t”. Once this is
understood, there doesn’t seem to be much point in construing the state vector as an
actual state of affairs, for the principal reason for doing so has always been to protect
the golden calf of determinism, which requires local realism in general and the local
reality of ψ(r, t) in particular. That probabilities are nonlocal in space and in time
makes perfect sense: The probability for an object to be found inside a region Ri at
a time t is not something that exists inside the region Ri or at the time t. A state of
affairs that is nonlocal in time and space, on the other hand, is not something that we
know how to make sense of.
That it makes no sense to construe the state vector as an actual state of affairs does
not mean that one cannot make ontological sense of quantum mechanics. However, in
order to do so one must steer clear of two diametrically opposed mistakes. The first is
the error of the instrumentalist, who regards as idle metaphysics any attempt to give a
realistic or epistemological account of how it is that the statistical regularities predicted
by quantum mechanics come out the way they do. For the instrumentalist, the results
of measurements are not possessed properties, for there are no “quantum objects” that
could possess them; there is no “quantum world” to which the results of measurements
could be attributed.
The instrumentalist throws out the baby with the bath water. Suppose that we
perform a series of position measurements, and that every position measurement yields
exactly one result (that is, each time exactly one detector clicks). In this case we are
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entitled to infer the existence of an entity O that persists through time, to think of the
clicks given off by the detectors as matters of fact about the successive positions of this
entity, to think of the behavior of the detectors as position measurements, and to think of
the detectors as detectors. The case for instrumentalism is that the position-indicating
clicks are not only sufficient but also necessary for the existence of the positions indicated
by the clicks. That is why Bohr [30, 31] insisted on the necessity of describing quantum
phenomena in terms of the experimental arrangements in which they are displayed. But
this does not mean that there is no object to which the indicated positions can be
attributed. What it means is that the contingent properties15 of the quantum world are
extrinsic rather than intrinsic, in the sense that the existence of a fact indicating that
O is (has the property) q is necessary for O’s being q: The properties of the quantum
world are what can be inferred from property-indicating facts (including the outcomes of
laboratory experiments) or from measurement results (if “measurement result” is taken
in the general sense of “property-indicating fact”). This tells us something significant
about the quantum world, rather than controverts the existence of a quantum world.
On this interpretation, the number of objects that exist at any one time is as extrinsic
as are the properties that can be attributed to them. It is only because every time
the same number of detectors click (in the previous example, one) that there exists,
at the times of the position measurements, the same determinate number of objects.
The quantum world lacks intrinsic properties, including the property of containing a
determinate number of objects. But, again, this is not the same as saying that there is
no quantum world. There is something to which a particular number of spatial relations
and a particular number of corresponding relata can be attributed, provided that the
attribution is warranted by facts. This something is E . The quantum world is E plus
whichever properties are warranted by the facts, including the number of times that E
is instantiated.
The opposite mistake is the error of the quantum realist, who endorses the following
“sufficiency condition” [32, p. 72]: “If we can predict with certainty, or at any rate with
probability one, the result of measuring a physical quantity at time t, then at the time
t there exists an element of reality corresponding to the physical quantity and having a
value equal to the predicted measurement result”. To begin with, p (Ri, t) = 1 does not
mean that the probability of finding O in Ri is one at the time t. Instead, it means that
the probability of finding O in Ri at the time t is one. There is a significant difference
between these two interpretations. Since probabilities are not things that exist in time
or at times, one cannot speak of a probability as having such and such a value at such
and such a time. One can only speak of the probability of finding O in Ri at the time t.
This probability exists neither inside Ri nor at the time t. The insufficiency of Redhead’s
“sufficiency condition” hinges on the nonexistence of the particular time t in the absence
of an actual measurement performed at the time t, as I proceed to show.
A particular region R, recall, does not exist unless it is physically realized with the
help of a macroscopic boundary, as defined in the previous section. And it does not exist
for O (that is, the difference between “O is inside R at t” and “O is outside R at t” has
15A property q attributable to O is a contingent property of O iff it is not necessarily possessed by O.
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no physical reality) unless there is a matter of fact about O’s whereabouts with respect
to R (“inside” or “outside”) at the time t (that is, unless there is an actual event or
state of affairs, such as the click of a detector, from which the truth of either “inside”
or “outside” can be inferred). Since the spatial distinctions that we make in our heads
are not physically real per se, they need to be realized in order to be physically real –
they need a physical “hook” from which they can “dangle”. This hook is to be sought
among the actual events and states of affairs that happen or obtain, and specifically
among those that indicate the value of a relative position (from a given range of values
such as “inside Ri”, i = 1, . . . , n). The possessed values of relative positions dangle from
position-indicating facts. And so do the actually existing spatial distinctions, since they
are contingent on the possessed values of relative positions.
An immediate consequence of the extrinsic nature of contingent properties is that the
position of one object A relative to the laboratory frame may be definite with respect to
a given partition of this frame (there may be a matter of fact about the particular region
containing A), while the position of another object B may be indefinite with respect
to the same partition (there may not be any matter of fact indicating the particular
region containing B). In other words, a particular spatial distinction may be real for
one object and not real for another. The particular region R may exist for one object
and not exist for another.
The particular time t, likewise, does not exist unless it is physically realized. Since
temporal distinctions are not real per se, they too need to be realized; they too need a
physical hook from which they can dangle. Once again the hook is to be found among
the actual events and states of affairs that happen or obtain, but now specifically among
those that indicate not only the possessed value of some observable but also the time
at which this is possessed. The times at which the extrinsic properties of the quantum
world are possessed are themselves extrinsic: They dangle from facts indicating both
that a property is possessed and when it is possessed. An immediate consequence of the
extrinsic nature of the times at which properties are possessed, is that a particular time
t may be real for one object and not real for another object. For instance, it may be
real for a laboratory clock but not real for the quantum system at hand. Where O is
concerned, the particular time t exists iff the possession by O of some property q at the
time t is factually warranted (that is, iff there is a property q such that the inference
“O is q at t” is warranted by facts). Otherwise t does not exist for O, and O cannot be
said to exist at the particular time t.
In nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, where the number of objects or subsystems
is constant, we feel that we may imagine a particle as existing also between the times
at which it has factually warranted properties, and we feel that we may imagine it as
permanently possessing such invariable properties as a mass or an electric charge. If a
region R is surrounded by an impenetrable barrier, and if the presence of O in R at a
time t is factually warranted, we further feel that we may imagine O as being inside R
also before and after the time t. But let us be clear about the meanings of the temporal
referents “between the times at which it has factually warranted properties” and “before
and after the time t”. Since time is not a set of instants, this cannot mean “at any or
every instant between those times” or “at any or every instant before or after t”. It can
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only mean “during the continuous, undifferentiated time spans between those times”
or “during the continuous, undifferentiated time spans before and after t”. Are these
legitimate temporal referents?
A particular time t′ exists only if it is indicated by an actual event or state of
affairs, and it exists for O only if it is the factually warranted time of possession, by
O, of a factually warranted property. Are the undifferentiated time spans τi between
the particular times ti, at which O has factually warranted properties qi, nevertheless
legitimate temporal referents for attributions to O? The answer depends on whether the
facts that indicate the possession of the respective properties qi at the respective times
ti can be thought of as indicating the possession of the same properties during the time
spans τi. In nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, this is the case where the property of
individuated existence is concerned: If the existence of an individual object O at the
times ti is warranted by actual events or states of affairs (that is, if O is detected at the
times ti) then O also exists as an individual during the intervening time spans τi. And
if the presence of O in R at the time t is warranted by some actual state of affairs, this
state of affairs also warrants the presence of O in R during the preceding and succeeding
undifferentiated time spans – but not at any particular time t′ during these time spans.
Unless the presence of O in R (or the possession by O of any other contingent property)
at t′ is factually warranted, the particular time t′ does not exist for O, and O cannot be
said to exist at t′.
Thus we can predict (as well as retrodict) with probability one that O will be (would
have been) found inside R at the time t′ if the appropriate measurement is (had been)
performed at t′, but we cannot affirm that at the particular time t′ there exists an
element of reality corresponding to the presence of O in R. Unless the measurement
is actually performed at t′, t′ does not exist for O, so an element of reality involving
O cannot exist at t′. While the instrumentalist errs by ignoring the possibility of a
quantum world with extrinsic properties, the quantum realist errs by ignoring the fact
that the properties of the quantum world are extrinsic, and that, therefore, probability
one is not sufficient for the existence of an element of reality.16
In a relativistic world, in which the number of objects or subsystems is itself a vari-
able and contingent property, we may imagine a closed system as existing also between
the times at which it has factually warranted properties, and we may attribute to it
its conserved quantities during these undifferentiated time spans, provided that at some
time their possession is warranted by facts. But between the times at which the number
of subsystems has a factually warranted value, there is only one logical subject that
has a counterpart in the physical world, namely existence itself. Apart from the con-
served quantities that are enduringly attributable to it, this has properties (including
the number of times that it is instantiated) only if and only when they are warranted
by facts.
16An anonymous referee (of a different paper and a different journal) asserts that standard quantum
mechanics does not include Redhead’s “sufficiency condition” but instead encompasses the “eigenstate-
eigenvalue link”, according to which an element of reality corresponding to an eigenvalue of an observable
exists at time t iff the system at t is “in the corresponding eigenstate of this observable”. This too is
incorrect, and for exactly that same reason.
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7 Indefiniteness, Macroscopic Objects,
And the Emergence of Causality
The conceptual innovation due to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics
(CIQM) has been characterized by Stapp [33] in the following words: “The theoretical
structure did not extend down and anchor itself on fundamental microscopic space-time
realities. Instead it turned back and anchored itself in the concrete sense realities that
form the basis of social life.” The first part of this statement belongs to the core of
the CIQM, and it is what makes this interpretation superior to any interpretation that
allows for fundamental microscopic space-time realities. There is no general consensus
as to the other claims that form part of the CIQM. Bohr’s cryptic and not always con-
sistent utterances on the subject have been invoked to support a variety of conflicting
readings. Stapp’s reading restricts physics to perceived and communicable phenomena.
Science, however, is driven by the desire to know how things really are, and it owes its
immense success in large measure to the belief that this can be discovered. Unless there
is conclusive proof to the contrary, it would be premature to relinquish this powerful
“sustaining myth” [34]. But if the theoretical structure is anchored neither in micro-
scopic space-time realities nor in concrete sense realities, then what supports it? The
answer is, property- and time-indicating facts.
Loewer [35] associates with the CIQM the following claim: “An isolated quantum
system evolves in conformity with a linear deterministic law (Schro¨dinger’s equation) un-
less it is measured. Measurements are governed by an indeterministic law – the collapse
postulate.” This – the von Neumann-Dirac interpretation – cannot be part of the CIQM,
given that the core of the CIQM rejects elementary space-time realities and therefore
rejects elementary time realities. Because time is not a set of such realities (instants), a
measurement does not prepare an instantaneous state of affairs that crawls predictably
through an intrinsically and infinitely differentiated time until it unpredictably changes
into a different instantaneous state of affairs. All that a measurement “prepares” is
probabilities, and probabilities are not things that exist or evolve in time. Nor are
density operators and state vectors such things, considering that they themselves are
essentially (that is, by definition) probability measures on the possible outcomes of mea-
surements. “[T]here is no interpolating wave function giving the ‘state of the system’
between measurements” [36].
Quantum-mechanical probabilities are conditional. The (standard) Born probabili-
ties are conditional on (i) a prediction basis (the actual events or states of affairs that
determine the “preparation”), (ii) the observable Q that is being measured (including its
range of possible values), (iii) the time t at which this is measured, and (iv) the existence
of a measurement result (that is, a matter of fact about the actual value of Q at the time
t). ABL probabilities, named after Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz [37], are condi-
tional on an inference basis rather than a prediction basis. This inference basis includes,
in addition to the “preparation”, the actual events or states of affairs that determine the
“retroparation” of the system [38, 39, 40, 41].17 Quantum-mechanical probabilities are
17The ABL probability with which a measurement of the observable Q between the “preparation”
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determined by facts (not mediately via an evolving, collapsible, instantaneous state of
affairs but directly), and they cannot be assigned without specifying both an observable
and a time at which this is measured. Hence it should be clear that the time on which
quantum-mechanical probabilities, density operators, and state vectors depend is the
specified time of a specified measurement, rather than the time of an evolving state of
affairs. The parameter t in the (Born) probability distribution
p (Ri, t) = Tr(W(t)P(Ri)) = 〈ψ(t)|P(Ri)|ψ(t)〉 =
∫
Ri
d3r ψ∗(r, t)ψ(r, t)
is not the time at which the probability of finding O in Ri has the value p (Ri, t).
Instead it is either the time of an actually performed measurement determining the
particular region Ri containing O or the specified time of a counterfactually performed
such measurement.
Nothing in quantum physics corresponds to the intrinsically and infinitely differ-
entiated time through which, according to a certain folk belief, the present “moves” or
“advances”. Nothing in quantum physics corresponds to the related notion of an instan-
taneous state that “moves” or “advances” through an ordered set of preexistent instants
having the cardinality of the “real line”. And therefore nothing in quantum physics
warrants the other folk belief according to which causal influences are carried towards
the future by an instantaneous state of affairs (and therefore, in a relativistic world, con-
formably to the principle of local action). Where quantum physics is concerned, all the
determining that goes on in the physical world is the determining by property-indicating
facts (actually obtained measurement results) of probabilities associated with the pos-
sible results of specified measurements that are actually or counterfactually performed
at specified times. What does no take place in the physical world is a determining by
property-indicating facts of other property-indicating facts. There are no causal links be-
tween factually warranted properties or between the corresponding property-indicating
actual events or states of affairs.
The probabilities of classical physics are subjective. They come into play whenever
the exact state of a system is unknown, intractable, or irrelevant to the problem at hand.
Quantum-mechanical probabilities, on the other hand, have an objective as well as a
subjective application. If observable Q is actually measured, the probabilities associated
with the range of possible values of Q are subjective; they are based on a limited
knowledge that does not take account of the actual measurement result. This applies
not only to Born probabilities, which take account of the system’s “preparation” only,
but also to ABL probabilities, which also take account of the system’s “retroparation”.
On the other hand, if no measurement is made at the time t, the ABL probabilities
associated with Q’s range of possible values and the specified time t are objective, in the
represented by the state |ψ1〉 and the “retroparation” represented by the state |ψ2〉 yields the result qi,
is given by the ABL formula
PABL(qi) =
∣∣〈ψ2|PQ=qi |ψ1〉∣∣2
Σj
∣∣〈ψ2|PQ=qj |ψ1〉∣∣2
,
where the PQ=qi projects on the subspace corresponding to the eigenvalue qi of Q [38].
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sense that they have nothing to do with ignorance. All relevant facts have been taken into
account; there is nothing for us to be ignorant of. Born probabilities in general contain
a subjective element even if Q is not actually measured, for they ignore the relevant
matters of fact about the properties of the system at later times. Born probabilities
can be objective only if there aren’t any matters of fact about the future properties
of the system. Thus objective probabilities are always assigned to counterfactuals –
conditional statements that presuppose the falsity of their antecedents, which are of the
form “If Q were measured”, – and if there are relevant matters of fact about the future
properties of the system, they have to be calculated using the ABL formula.18
Now is the time to make good on my promise to define what exactly I mean by
an “indefinite” or “fuzzy” position. Let {Ri|i = 1, . . . , n} be some partition of space
(that is, of the “space” of values available for attribution to the positions of objects
relative to some reference object O.) Let O(t) ⊂ R denote the proposition “Object
O is inside region R at time t”. (This means that at the time t the position of O
relative to O has the value “inside R”; it does not mean that it has a definite value
falling inside the range R.) Let Q be the particular position observable whose range of
possible values is {O(t) ⊂ Ri|i = 1, . . . , n}. Finally, let Q ⇒ O(t) ⊂ Rk stand for the
conditional “IfQ is (or were) measured at the time t, O is (or would be) found insideRk”.
The position of O is indefinite with respect to {Ri|i = 1, . . . , n} iff (i) the conditionals
{Q ⇒ O(t) ⊂ Ri|i = 1, . . . , n} are counterfactuals (Q is not actually measured) and
(ii) the objective probabilities associated with these counterfactuals are positive for at
least two i. For instance, if there isn’t any matter of fact concerning the slit taken by
an electron, the electron’s transverse position at the time of its passing the slit plate is
indefinite just in case the probabilities associated with the following counterfactuals are
positive: “If there were a matter of fact about the slit taken by the electron, it would
indicate that the electron went through slit i” (i = 1, 2).
Note that O’s position at a specified time t may be indefinite with respect to some
partition or range of possible values and definite with respect to another partition or
range of possible values. Consider, for instance, a three-slit experiment incorporating
a device D that is capable of indicating whether the electron went through slit A or
through the union B∪C of the remaining slits, but not capable of distinguishing between
eB = “the electron went through slit B” and eC . Suppose that D indicates that the
electron went through B ∪C. If the respective probabilities associated with eB and eC
are positive and objective, the electron’s transverse position at the time of its passing
18Kastner’s [42, 43] objection to Vaidman’s [44, 45, 46] counterfactual usage of the ABL formula has
no bearing on my counterfactual usage of this formula, as may be gleaned from Kastner’s withdrawal of a
paper [47] in which she raised similar objections to the way I assign ABL probabilities to counterfactuals
in my forthcoming [41], admitting that her paper was “based on a misunderstanding of Mohrhoff’s use
of the term ‘counterfactual’ ” and that “Mohrhoff’s counterfactual uses of the ABL rule correspond to
special cases in which such use is valid”. The counterfactuals to which I assign ABL probabilities have
antecedents of the form “if Q had been measured between t1 and t2 (while actually no measurement
is made between the preparation at t1 and the retroparation at t2)”, whereas it was Kastner’s initial
impression that I allow antecedents of the form “if Q had been measured between t1 and t2 (while
actually a different, noncommuting observable Q′ was measured between t1 and t2)”. That my use of
the ABL formula is the correct use also transpires from Cohen’s [48] analysis.
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the slit plate is definite with respect to the alternative defined by D but indefinite with
respect to the alternative “eB or eC”.
The above definition of positional indefiniteness makes reference to objective proba-
bilities, and such probabilities, as we have just seen, can be assigned only to counterfac-
tuals. The very possibility of assigning objective probabilities to the possible results of
an unperformed measurement entails that unmeasured observables lack values, and that
the possessed values of quantum-mechanical observables are extrinsic. The indefiniteness
of a contingent property thus entails the property’s extrinsic nature. The indefiniteness
of the physical world makes it necessary to conceive of its contingent properties as ex-
trinsic, or supervenient on property-indicating facts. A position can be indefinite only
because (i) it dangles from what happens or is the case in the rest of the world and
(ii) what happens or is the case in the rest of the world may not be enough to determine
its precise value. If the positions of material objects were not taken from (defined by)
position-indicating facts (that is, if they were intrinsic), they would have to be taken
from an intrinsically differentiated space. But an intrinsically differentiated space is
an infinitely differentiated space, and such a space has no room for indefinite values.
Thus unless we are willing to take seriously the extrinsic nature of quantum-mechanical
properties, we shall not be in a position to make proper sense of the indefiniteness that
is the hallmark of quantum mechanics, and hence of quantum mechanics itself.
One can always conceive of a partition {Ri|i = 1, . . . , n} into regions that are so small
that the following is true for any specified time and any object O other than O: The
position of O relative toO is indefinite with respect to some subset {Rk(O)|k = 1, . . . ,m}
of {Ri}. This is the same as saying that there is a subset {Rk} of {Ri} such that the
conditionals {Q ⇒ O(t) ⊂ Rk|k = 1, . . . ,m} are counterfactuals and the probabilities
associated with these counterfactuals are positive for at least two k. And this is the same
as saying that no two objects ever have a definite relative position. A pair of material
objects could have an exact relative position only if there existed material objects capable
of indicating an exact relative position, but such objects do not exist. Facts never
warrant the possession of a “sharp” relative position. However, there are objects, which
I will call “macroscopic”, the relative positions of which are not manifestly indefinite.
By a macroscopic objectM I mean an object that satisfies the following criterion: Every
factually warranted inference to the position of M (relative to any other macroscopic
object M) at any specified time t is predictable on the basis of factually warranted
inferences to (i) the positions ofM (relative toM) at earlier times and (ii) the positions
of other objects (relative to M) at t or earlier times.
Let me say this again. Every position measurement that ever has been or will be
performed on M (that is, every matter of fact that has a bearing on the position of
M relative to another macroscopic object M) has a range of values {M ⊂ Ri|i =
1, . . . , n} between which the measurement can distinguish. If we take into account every
position measurement performed on M before a time t and every position measurement
performed on every other object before or at the time t, and if the result of every position
measurement on M made at the time t is predictable19 on that basis via the pertinent
19By saying that a factually warranted inference to the position of a macroscopic object is predictable,
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classical laws, and if this is the case for every time t at which a position measurement
is performed on M , then, and only then, M is a macroscopic object. In this case
nothing ever indicates a departure from what is predictable on the basis of the pertinent
classical laws and earlier position-indicating facts. When I say that the positions of
macroscopic objects are not manifestly indefinite, what I mean is that the indefiniteness
of these positions is never evidenced by such a departure. Every matter of fact about
M ’s present position follows via the pertinent classical laws from matters of fact about
M ’s past positions and about the past and present positions of other objects.20
The above definition of a “macroscopic object” M involves another macroscopic
objectM. This is as it should be since objects are macroscopic by virtue of their relative
positions. We may introduce a “macroscopic (reference) frame” (previously called the
“laboratory frame”) that is riveted to any macroscopic object, and in which the position
of every other macroscopic object is not manifestly indefinite. To see that the choice
of reference object is immaterial, let {Ci}, i = 1, 2, be two coordinate systems having
for their respective origins the centers of mass of two macroscopic objects Mi. Even
though the coordinate points of {C2} are somewhat fuzzy relative to {C1}, the two sets
of coordinate points are physically equivalent, not merely “for all practical purposes” but
strictly, for there isn’t any actual, physical difference matching the conceptual difference
between them. By definition, the relative position of a pair of macroscopic objects is
not manifestly indefinite. Hence nothing ever happens or is the case that would make
it possible to distinguish between the two frames.
It is one thing to define macroscopic objects but quite another to show that such
objects exist. There can be an unpredictable matter of fact about the position of O at a
time t only if there are detectors with sensitive regions that are smaller than the space
over which O’s position is distributed. (By saying that O’s position is distributed over
a set {Ri} of mutually disjoint regions, I mean that the prior probabilities associated
with the conditionals Q⇒ O(t) ⊂ Ri are positive.) But detectors with sufficiently small
sensitive regions do not always exist. There is a finite limit to the definiteness of the
relative positions of material objects, and there is a finite limit to the spatial resolution
of actually existing detectors. Hence there must be objects whose positions are the
sharpest in existence. The position of such an object cannot be manifestly indefinite,
for want of detectors capable of probing the space over which it is distributed.21
I do not mean that the position-indicating fact is predictable, but that the position indicated by the
fact is predictable. Note that several position measurements (with different ranges of values) can be
performed on the same object at the same time.
20Since the formal expression of the indefiniteness of an object’s position refers to counterfactuals,
evidence of positional indefiniteness cannot be direct. The most direct evidence we can have is the
unpredictability of position-indicating facts. What is evidenced by the unpredictability of a position-
indicating actual event e is a counterfactual indefiniteness: the indefiniteness that would have obtained
had e not occurred, other things being equal.
21Note that the definition of a “macroscopic object” does not stipulate that events indicating depar-
tures from the classically predicted positions occur with zero probability. An object is entitled to the
label “macroscopic” if no such event actually occurs. What matters is not whether such an event may
occur (with whatever probability) but whether it ever does occur. We cannot be certain that a given
object qualifies as macroscopic, inasmuch as not all matters of fact about its whereabouts are accessible
to us. But we can be certain that macroscopic objects exist, and that the most likely reason why M
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While the positions of things dangle from (are supervenient on) position-indicating
facts, the positions of macroscopic objects do so in a way that evinces no indefiniteness.
Although no object ever follows a definite trajectory, the positions of macroscopic ob-
jects – “macroscopic positions”, for short – evolve in a completely predictable fashion.
Applying to macroscopic positions the formalism of quantum mechanics is therefore
completely uncalled-for. It is perfectly legitimate to treat these positions as forming a
self-contained system of intrinsic positions that dangle causally from each other, rather
than a system of extrinsic positions that dangle ontologically from position-indicating
facts. While even a macroscopic object has a position only because of the facts from
which this can be inferred, the dependence of this position on position-indicating facts
is a qualitative (ontological or existential) dependence, not a quantitative one. For the
quantitative purposes of physics, it is legitimate to ignore this dependence, to consider
macroscopic positions “in themselves” (out of relation to position-indicating facts), to
treat them as facts (rather than as inferences from facts), and to apply to them clas-
sical causal concepts. It ought to be borne in mind, however, that causal concepts are
emergent: Causality isn’t part of the ontological foundation. As we saw earlier in this
section, all the determining that goes on in the physical world is the determining of
probabilities associated with possibilities. There aren’t any causally determined facts.
Causality, like color, lies in the mind of the beholder [49].22
8 Interpreting the Copenhagen Interpretation
Much of what has been said in the last two sections hinges on the following questions:
What constitutes a (matter of) fact? What is an actual event or state of affairs? We
are now in a position to answer these questions. As we have just seen, it is legitimate
to ignore the extrinsic nature of macroscopic positions, to treat them as facts. The
relevant facts, actual events, or actual states of affairs either are macroscopic positions
or are definable in terms of such positions. It is irrelevant that the property-indicating
position of a macroscopic pointer needle dangles ontologically from facts that involve
other macroscopic positions. Where the indicated property is concerned, the indicating
position can be thought of as intrinsic, and hence as a position-indicating fact.23
Thus there exists a “classical domain” of (macroscopic) positions that are not man-
ifestly indefinite, and that can be thought of as intrinsic or as being factual per se.
is macroscopic is the nonexistence of detectors with sensitive regions that are smaller than the space
over which M ’s position is distributed. (M could also be macroscopic for the unlikely reason that such
detectors, though they exist, never indicate a departure from M ’s classically predicted position.)
22“The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a
bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm.” –
Bertrand Russell [50].
23An apparatus pointer is not strictly a macroscopic object according to the given definition. In a
typical measurement, nothing allows us to predict the pointer’s final position. However, before and
after the measurement the pointer behaves as a macroscopic object, whose position can be considered
independent of other position-indicating facts. Therefore the transition from the initial to the final
pointer position can also be considered independent of other position-indicating facts, and thus as an
actual event.
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This is fortunate, for otherwise quantum mechanics would be inconsistent, as its very
formulation presupposes property- and time-indicating facts. Until recently the CIQM
has been the only interpretation of quantum mechanics that acknowledges the logical
dependence of quantum mechanics on a classical domain, and therefore, in my opinion,
it has been the only interpretation worth considering. The CIQM has been censured for
being “vague, obscure, and maybe even inconsistent” by Loewer [35], but these stric-
tures do not touch the core of the CIQM, which consists in the rejection of fundamental
microscopic space-time realities and the substitution for them of property-indicating
facts amenable to classical description. They address extraneous attempts to reintro-
duce unwarranted classical ideas, such as the notion of a quantum state that evolves in
an intrinsically differentiated time.
According to Loewer, the vagueness of the conceptual muddle he passes off as the
“Copenhagen interpretation” lies in the absence of (i) a clear distinction between clas-
sical and quantum systems and (ii) a clear definition of “measurement”. Its obscurity
consists in its “spooky” nonlocality, in the “relationship between measurement and de-
terminate reality”, and in our (or at least, Loewer’s) inability to understand how the
position of a particle can lack a determinate value. Its possible inconsistency is that
(according to Loewer) “it makes assertions about the nature of quantum-mechanical
reality” and at the same time “denies that anything can be known about that reality”.
As I said, none of these strictures touch the core of the CIQM. In my forthcom-
ing [41] I have expanded this core into a complete ontological interpretation, dubbed
the “Pondicherry interpretation of quantum mechanics” (PIQM). The PIQM makes a
clear distinction between the classical and quantum domains. The classical domain con-
tains all those possessed properties that are not manifestly indefinite (including those
that warrant inferences to possessed properties in the quantum domain). The quantum
domain contains all other factually warranted properties. The term “measurement” is
likewise clearly defined. A measurement is not something that causes the “collapse” of
an evolving quantum state. Every property-indicating fact (that is, every event or state
of affairs in the classical domain warranting an inference to some possessed property)
qualifies as a “measurement result”. The relationship between measurement and deter-
minate reality is equally clear. Determinate reality is the totality of factually warranted
properties, while measurements provide the property-indicating facts.
As to the alleged nonlocality of the CIQM, it depends. If this is supposed to mean
that “a measurement of a part of a system at one location can instantaneously change
the physical situation of far distant parts of that system” [35], then it does not exist.
This kind of action at a distance is one of the absurdities that follow from the spurious
notion of an evolving quantum state. According to both the PIQM and the solid core
of the CIQM, all that the quantum formalism tells us about is objective correlations
between possibilities and statistical correlations between factually warranted properties
or property-indicating facts – diachronic correlations between the factually warranted
properties of the same system at different times and synchronic correlations between
the factually warranted properties of different systems in spacelike separation. It says
nothing whatsoever about causal connections between the correlated properties or facts.
In particular, it says nothing about changes in physical situations that are caused by
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measurements [41]. On the other hand, the very fact that quantum mechanics is incon-
sistent with local action, as was shown in Sec. 5, implies its nonlocality. Nonlocality is
a characteristic of the observed correlations (the diachronic as well as the synchronic
ones) and thus independent of any particular explanation of the correlations (such as
an instantaneous action at a distance).
As to the “spookiness” of the nonlocality evinced by the correlations, it is a subject
for psychology or neurophysiology rather than physics, and so is Loewer’s inability to
understand how the position of a particle can lack a determinate value. These non-
physical issues deserve a separate section (Sec. 10). That a sense of the miraculous
accompanies all fundamental explanations is to be expected, however. Explanations be-
gin with the fundamental behavior of matter, which can be described, but which cannot
itself be explained. (If it could, it wouldn’t be fundamental.) Diachronic correlations
that are not manifestly indeterministic can be passed off as causal explanations. But
when we deal with synchronic correlations or diachronic correlations that are manifestly
indeterministic, causal concepts are out of place. Trying to causally explain these cor-
relations is putting the cart in front of the horse. It is the correlations that explain
why causal explanations work to the extent they do. They work in the classical domain
where we are dealing with macroscopic objects, and where the correlations between
property-indicating facts evince no statistical variations (dispersion). If we go beyond
this domain, it becomes clear that even where no statistical variations are in evidence,
the correlations between facts are statistical rather than causal.
Loewer’s claim that the CIQM both “makes assertions about the nature of quantum-
mechanical reality” and “denies that anything can be known about that reality” is based
on the following claims, which he attributes to the CIQM: “The right way to understand
quantum mechanics is not as a true description of physical reality but rather as an in-
strument for predicting the outcomes of laboratory experiments. There is no coherent
interpretation of the quantum-mechanical formalism as describing an unobservable re-
ality that is responsible for those experimental results. That reality is forever beyond
our ken.” The PIQM denies not merely the possibility of such an interpretation but
the very existence of an unobservable reality that is responsible for the experimental
results. There is no reality beyond our ken. Quantum mechanics is an instrument for
assigning conditional probabilities to possible property-indicating facts on the basis of
actual property-indicating facts. Under certain conditions, specified above, these condi-
tional probabilities are objective and indicative of an objective indefiniteness. This has
implications concerning the actual spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world.
And all this is part of the true and complete description of physical reality that quan-
tum mechanics affords.24 If there is anything that is incomplete, it is the physical world,
but its incompleteness exists only in relation to a conceptual framework that is more
detailed than the physical world, as I proceed to show.
24Saying that quantum mechanics affords a true and complete description of physical reality is obvi-
ously very different from claiming that the state vector is such a description.
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9 The Spatiotemporal Differentiation of the Physical
World
Because there exists a finite limit to the spatial resolution of actually existing detectors,
any finite region R contains at most a finite number of regions Rk the distinctness of
which is physically realized. Accordingly, for any material object O located within R
at most a finite number of alternative positions (“inside Rk”) are available as possible
attributes. Hence there exists in our minds (that is, we can conceive of) a finite partition
{Ri} of the macroscopic frame that exists only in our minds. The elements of {Ri} are so
small that there aren’t any detectors capable of realizing their conceptual distinctness.
Nothing in the physical world corresponds to the distinctions we make between those
regions.
Suppose that {Ri} is a partition of R at the limit of resolution achieved by actually
existing detectors. How should we visualize this partition? Certainly not as a set of
sharply bounded regions! Sharp boundaries imply exact positions, and exact positions
imply the existence of detectors with infinitesimal sensitive regions, in contradiction to
the finite actual differentiation of R. Since no detector ever has a sharply bounded sensi-
tive region, no object ever possesses an exact position, and since no object ever possesses
an exact position, no detector ever has a sharply bounded sensitive region. Even the
boundaries of macroscopic detectors are fuzzy. But they are fuzzy only in relation to a
finer partition of R, and this exists solely in our minds. Thus not only the mental picture
of sharply bounded regions Ri but also the mental picture of fuzzily bounded regions
Ri is more detailed than the finitely differentiated reality it is supposed to represent.
The boundaries of these regions are neither sharp nor fuzzy! The notion that “sharp”
and “fuzzy” are jointly exhaustive terms originates in an inadequate theoretical repre-
sentation of the world’s actual spatial differentiation. It involves a conception that is
inconsistent with quantum mechanics – the conception of an intrinsically and infinitely
differentiated space.
While no object ever has a definite position, the positions of macroscopic objects are
not manifestly indefinite. How real is the indefiniteness of a position that is not mani-
festly indefinite? The answer is, not real at all. In a world that is spatially differentiated
only to the extent that spatial relations and distinctions can be inferred from facts, no
object has a sharp position. But there are objects that have the sharpest positions in
existence, and the position of such an object is not fuzzy in any actual sense. For its
fuzziness to be actual in some sense, the position has to be distributed, either statisti-
cally or counterfactually, over the sensitive regions of actually existing detectors. But
if it were distributed over such regions, it would not be among the sharpest positions
in existence – the positions of the detectors would be sharper. Thus the positions of
macroscopic objects are fuzzy only in relation to an unrealized degree of spatial dif-
ferentiation. The indefiniteness of a macroscopic position exists only in relation to a
theoretical framework that is more detailed than the physical world.
As positions have no physical reality unless they are attributable to material objects,
so times have no physical reality unless they are attributable to possessed properties,
as the times at which these are possessed. The reason this is so is that time, like
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space, isn’t something that is intrinsically differentiated. It takes time-indicating facts
to differentiate the world timewise. But times are indicated by factually warranted
relative positions. Since these are more or less indefinite, the indicated times, too, are
more or less indefinite. For instance, if there isn’t any matter of fact about the time Ts
at which an electron passes through the slit plate, Ts lacks a definite value with respect
to any partition of the interval between the time of emission by the electron gun and the
time of detection behind the slit plate.25 However, there are macroscopic times that are
not manifestly indefinite, just as there are macroscopic positions the indefiniteness of
which is never evidenced by departures from what is predictable on the basis of classical
laws and earlier property-indicating facts.
Let us extend our definition of the “macroscopic frame” to include the not mani-
festly indefinite times indicated by macroscopic positions. It follows from what has just
been said that there exists in our minds (that is, we can conceive of) a partition of
the macroscopic frame into finite intervals of time that are so small that nothing in the
physical world corresponds to the distinctions we make between these intervals. Once
again the distinctions exist solely in our minds. The physical world is temporally dif-
ferentiated only to the extent that temporal relations and distinctions can be inferred
from facts, and the facts warrant neither the inference of a definite temporal relation nor
the partition of any finite interval of physical time into infinitely many time spans. As
there is a finite limit to the spatial resolution of actually existing detectors, so there is a
finite limit to the temporal resolution of actually existing clocks26 [59]. No property is
ever possessed at a definite time. But there are clocks, which we may call “macroscopic
clocks”, that indicate the sharpest times in existence, which we may call “macroscopic
times”. Macroscopic times are not fuzzy in any actual sense; they are fuzzy only in
relation to an unrealized degree of temporal differentiation. Like the indefiniteness of a
macroscopic position, the indefiniteness of a macroscopic time exists only in relation to
a theoretical framework that is more detailed than the physical world.
The seemingly intractable problem of understanding quantum mechanics is a con-
sequence of our dogged insistence on obtruding onto the physical world a theoretical
framework that is more detailed than the physical world. We have this inveterate ten-
dency of building reality “from the bottom up”. Atomizing is the way we naturally
think. As Wilson [60, p. 50] put it, “[t]he descent to minutissima. . . is a driving im-
pulse of Western natural science. It is a kind of instinct.” Not only do we atomize
25The use of a capital T instead of either a lower-case t or the operator symbol Tˆ is intended as a
reminder that time is not a proper quantum-mechanical observable (a Hermitian operator on a Hilbert
space), and that Ts, consequently, is not one of the possible values of such an observable. In general,
neither a self-adjoint time operator conjugate to the Hamiltonian [51, 52] nor a time-of-arrival opera-
tor [53, 54, 55] exists. This is a consequence of the fact that quantum-mechanical probability distributions
are distributions over the possible results of possible measurements that are actually or counterfactu-
ally performed at specified times. There are no quantum-mechanical probability distributions over time
intervals.
26There is another reason why during a finite time span τ a material object can possess at most a
finite number of distinct time-indicating properties. Let QC be an observable whose eigenkets represent
the distinct time-indicating properties of a clock C. If QC were measured an infinite number of times
during τ , C would not function as a clock, for the result would always be the same [56, 57, 58].
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matter (which has its physical legitimacy) but we also atomize space and time (which
is a mistake), and we tend to model the atomization of matter after the atomization
of space (which is another mistake). That is, we tend to think of the parts of matter
as being defined by the parts of space. In actual fact, the ultimate “parts” of matter
are the fundamental particles, and these are not defined by the “parts” of space. Space
isn’t something that has parts, so it cannot serve to define parts. The “parts” of matter
are defined by the spatial relations that exist between them. This view, and only this,
allows the spatial relations to possess indefinite values.
The fundamental particles exist in space only in the sense that (more or less indefi-
nite) relative positions can be attributed to them. Considered in itself, out of relation to
other material objects, a fundamental particle does not exist in space, for in itself it has
neither a position nor a form. Physical space exists between the fundamental particles;
they unfold it by means of their relative positions; it is spanned by them. Moreover,
while multiplicity is attributable to the fundamental particles qua spatial relata, it is
not attributable to the fundamental particles considered out of relation to each other.
Reality, therefore, is built “top-down”: By entering into a multitude of spatial relations
with itself, E takes on not only the aspect of a spatially differentiated world but also
the aspect of a multiplicity of fundamental particles. And by allowing the relations
to change, to possess different values in succession, it takes on the further aspect of a
temporally differentiated world.
There are limits to the resulting differentiations. While the sharpest relative posi-
tions and times are indefinite only relative to an unrealized degree of differentiation,
the more fuzzy ones are indefinite relative to the realized degree of differentiation (that
is, they are manifestly indefinite). But manifestly indefinite positions and times cannot
be thought of as intrinsic. There is therefore another sense in which reality is built
“from the top down”. The positions of things are defined in terms of the not manifestly
indefinite relative positions of macroscopic objects, which can be thought of as being
factual by themselves. The times at which properties are possessed are defined in terms
of the not manifestly indefinite times indicated by macroscopic positions, which also can
be thought of as being factual by themselves. The positions of the microscopic parts
and the times at which they are possessed thus dangle from (are supervenient on) the
property- and time-indicating positions of macroscopic wholes.
10 Stuff and Nonsense
What is it that prevents us from coming to terms with quantum mechanics without ex-
traneous additions like hidden variables [22] or spontaneous collapses [61, 62, 63], with-
out using “world” in the plural [64], and without implicitly or explicitly distinguishing
between a mind-constructed “internal” or “empirical” reality and a mind-independent
“external” or “veiled” reality [65, p. 113][66] or dragging in consciousness or knowledge
in other ways [21, 23, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72]? It is the ide´e fixe that the world’s syn-
chronic multiplicity is founded on the introduction of surfaces that carve up space in
the manner of three-dimensional cookie cutters. I call it the “cookie cutter paradigm”
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(CCP).
If the physical reality of space-dividing surfaces is accepted, it needs to be accounted
for, and there are at least three ways of doing so. The first is to understand those
surfaces as boundaries between “full” and “empty” space (that is, as closed surfaces
encompassing some kind of stuff). This is the way of the Greek atomists, who taught
that atoms are filled with being while the empty space around them lacks being. The
second – the most literal version of the CCP – is due to Plato. Plato’s Forms have an
immaterial existence of their own, independently of their instantiation in the physical
world. Insofar as they bear spatial connotations, they connote closed surfaces. Divisions
in material space exist to the extent that Forms with spatial connotations are present
(instantiated) in the physical world.
The third way of accounting for the existence of spatial divisions is to attribute them
to space itself. On this account, all conceivable divisions of space are physically real and
intrinsic to space. Reduced to one dimension this leads to the view that a set of points in
one-to-one correspondence with the real numbers is intrinsic to a continuous line. This
raises the issue of whether these points “make up” or “fill” the line or are separated by
infinitesimal intervals. It is customary to equate real numbers whose decimal expansions
converge, e.g., 0.49¯ = 0.5. If we follow this practice – not everyone does [73, p. 263] –
then there aren’t any infinitesimal “gaps” between the points on a line.27 But if we
interpret real numbers as points on a continuous line, or use them to label such points,
then it is legitimate to consult the visual image of a continuous line, and to demand
that the properties we attribute to the real numbers be consistent with it. And arguably
the practice of equating numbers with convergent decimal expansions is not consistent
with the continuity of a line in phenomenal space.28 Be that as it may. What is clear is
that the idea that all conceivable divisions of phenomenal space are intrinsic to physical
space, leads naturally to the notion that physical space either contains or is identical
with the set R3.
Physicists have long since discarded the Democritean notion that the basic material
constituents are closed surfaces filled with continuous being. If they ever entertained the
Platonic notion that space-dividing surfaces owe their physical reality to Forms that have
a reality ante rem, they have long since discarded this notion as well. What remains
to be discarded is (i) the notion that space-dividing surfaces are physically real, and
(ii) the conception of space to which this notion leads if one rejects the Democritean
27Consider a line segment L with boundary points labeled 0 and 1, respectively. Next consider the
numbers in the interval I = (0, 1) that have a binary expansion of up to n digits. These numbers have
the general form 0.[n], where [n] is a string of n digits (0’s or 1’s). The points corresponding to these
numbers divide L into 2n segments of length ln = 2
−n. In the limit n→∞ we obtain all real numbers
in I . Let s be any real number and let (sn) be a sequence of real numbers such that s − sn = 2
−n.
If limn→∞ sn = s, so that in particular (in binary notation) 0.01¯ = 0.1, the assumption that there are
infinitesimal line segments between the points on L corresponding to the real numbers in I leads to a
contradiction, for the upper and lower boundaries of those segments are defined by the same number.
28Let {n} denote a string of n 1’s. (We again use binary notation.) If we visualize the line segment Ln
corresponding to the interval (0.0{n}, 0.1), and if we visualize the right end of Ln enlarged by a factor
2m with every increase of n by m, then the segment Ln+m corresponding (0.0{n+m}, 0.1) looks exactly
the same as Ln. And this ought to be equally true of the segment L∞ corresponding to (0.01¯, 0.1).
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and Platonic accounts. Sharp space-dividing surfaces exist solely in our minds. They do
not exist as the forms of material objects, for the forms of material objects are sets of
more or less indefinite relative positions between formless entities, rather than bounding
surfaces (Sec. 3). Nor are space-dividing surfaces intrinsic to physical space, as the
behavior of electrons in two-slit interference experiments amply demonstrates (Sec. 5).
To bring home just how insidiously the CCP prevents us from making sense of quan-
tum mechanics, let us examine some of its implications. To begin with, the idea that
synchronic multiplicity depends on a partition of space into mutually disjoint regions
implies the prior existence of a spatial expanse that gets partitioned or contains the
partitions. The CCP thus prejudices us in favor of substantivalism, a doctrine that we
found to be inconsistent with quantum mechanics. In conjunction with the CCP, sub-
stantivalism implies that not only space but each part of space is a separate constituent
of the world. If the parts of matter exist by virtue of the parts of space, spatial divisions
cannot arise from (processes involving) matter; they must be inherent in a preexistent
space.
What transpires next depends on whether the world is or is not infinitely divided
spacewise. If the division of space ends with the creation of finite bounded regions, as
in the respective theories of Democritus and Plato, it seems inevitable that we follow
these philosophers in attributing the existence of bounded regions to the existence of
material objects, and thus conceive of existing boundaries as forms of material objects.
But then the following question arises: Why can’t it happen that different material
objects overlap? The answer to this question is, because the CCP defines synchronic
multiplicity in terms of geometrical divisions. Suppose that there exist two bounded
regions A and B having a finite intersection C = A ∩ B. Then it is not the case that
there exist two material objects whose respective forms are the boundaries of A and
B. Instead there exist three such objects whose respective forms are the boundaries of
A − B, B − A, and C. The object occupying C is one object (which may be a part of
the object occupying A, or a part of the object occupying B, or a part of the object
occupying A∪B), rather than two objects (a part of the object occupying A and a part
of the object occupying B). Thus it is logically impossible for two objects to overlap
(that is, for a part of one object to occupy the same region of space as a part of another
object).
Material objects, however, move. This is something that bounded regions of space
per se, considered out of relation to time, cannot do, and this raises a further question.
We know that two material objects cannot “overlap”. If it seemed as if they did, their
apparent intersection would contain a part of either object rather than a part of each
object. If two identical objects came to occupy the same space, they would cease to be
two objects. But this does not explain why we never see a part of one object become
numerically identical with a part of another object, or two identical objects merge into
one object. The obvious “explanation” of this is that material objects are not only
bounded by surfaces but also “filled to capacity” with some continuous stuff.
Physics offers a different account of the apparent impenetrability of material objects:
a repulsive force. The physical reason why two material objects M and N lacking
common parts cannot come to occupy the same space is that their respective parts repel
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each other. This explanation involves the spatial relations, or the distances, between
the parts of M and the parts of N , as well as a force opposing attempts to reduce
those distances. It further involves the parts of M and the parts of N , but only as
the relata of those spatial relations. It does not involve them as bounded regions filled
with stuff. It involves neither the forms of the parts nor any spatially extended stuff.
Where physics is concerned, space-filling stuff and forms qua bounding surfaces are
explanatorily irrelevant. They are artefacts of the CCP and the assumption that the
division of space ends with finite bounded regions. In reality, as described by quantum
mechanics, there are no bounding surfaces. Forms are made of spatial relations between
formless parts. And if there is stuff, it consists in nothing but the spatial relata the
existence of which is implied by the spatial relations.
If the CCP is combined instead with the assumption that the division of space never
ends, or ends with infinitesimal regions or with a set of points cardinally equal to the
reals, it leads us up a different garden path. In this case all points or infinitesimal regions
are separate constituents of the world, and all physical properties are locally instantiated
– they are properties of those points or infinitesimal regions. The form of an ordinary
material object then consists of spatial relations between locally instantiated physical
properties. If we take into account that a generic material object is composed of a finite
number of noncomposite entities, we are led to conclude that the form of such an object
is made up of the spatial relations between physical properties that are instantiated at
a finite number of points or infinitesimal regions. It stands to reason that these locally
instantiated physical properties are the characteristics of a particle species: mass, spin,
and charges. Note that a pointlike form is not contained in this list of properties. Saying
that a fundamental particle is pointlike is the same as saying that its properties (not
including a form) are instantiated at a point or an infinitesimal region of space.
It is clear that the spatial relations between these locally instantiated properties can-
not be indefinite. The CCP thus makes it impossible to understand how the position of
a particle can lack a determinate value. If the synchronic multiplicity of the world con-
formed to the CCP, space would be intrinsically and infinitely divided, a noncomposite
object could not but exist at a definite point of space or inside a definite infinitesimal
region, and the distances between such objects would necessarily be sharp.29 If, as Al-
bert [23, p. 11] has claimed, the behavior of electrons in two-slit experiments is “quite
unlike what we know how to think about”, it is because we labor under the delusion
of the CCP. If “[n]obody knows how it can be like that”,30 it is because everybody is
deluded by the CCP. If we could accept that the synchronic multiplicity of the world
is based instead on spatial relations, we would have no reason to suppose that spatial
relations must have determinate values. On the contrary, taking into account that a
29Recall that the coordinates presupposed by quantum mechanics have a direct metric significance.
The “points of space” being Cartesian coordinate points, their distances are determinately related to
the differences between their coordinates.
30“I think it is safe to say that no one understands quantum mechanics. . . . Do not keep saying to
yourself, if you can possibly avoid it, ‘But how can it be like that?’ because you will go ‘down the drain’
into a blind alley from which nobody has yet escaped. Nobody knows how it can be like that” – R.P.
Feynman [74, p. 129].
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finite number of constituents is sufficient for the existence of any known material object,
we have reason to suppose that the relative positions of these constituents cannot have
determinate values. In fact, we know that what “fluffs out” matter is not a repulsive
force but the indefiniteness of the relative positions of its constituents (in conjunction
with the Pauli exclusion principle and the fact that those constituents are fermions).
If it were not for this indefiniteness – other things being equal – none of the familiar
objects around us would exist.
The CCP can lead to worse. This happens when the quantum state – by definition
a system of probability distributions – is construed not only as an instantaneous state
of affairs ψ(t) that evolves in an infinitely differentiated time but also as a local state of
affairs ψ(r) that assigns physical properties to the point r. This is done, for instance,
by Albert [23, p. 126], who sets out with the following bundle of assumptions: “Suppose
that there’s just one world. And suppose that there’s just one complete story of the
world that’s true. And suppose that quantum-mechanical state vectors are complete
descriptions of physical systems. And suppose that the dynamical equations of motion
are always [and, presumably, everywhere] exactly right.” The first assumption excludes
the many-worlds interpretation [64]; the second rules out the consistent-histories philos-
ophy [75, 76, 77]; the third eliminates Bohmian mechanics [22] and spontaneous collapse
theories [61, 62, 63]. The four assumptions together then lead to the many-minds in-
terpretation [23, 78], or so it is suggested by its proponents. Common to all of these
attempts to make sense of quantum mechanics is the idea that the dynamical equations
– in the simplest case, the Schro¨dinger equation; in the case of spontaneous collapse
theories, a modified, stochastic equation – are always and everywhere exactly obeyed,
where “always” and “everywhere” stand for “at every instant of time” and “at every
point of space”, respectively. Since the physical world is not infinitely differentiated
spacewise or timewise, these usual acceptations of “always” and “everywhere” have no
meaningful application to the physical world. For this reason alone all of the above
attempts to make sense of quantum mechanics are fatally flawed.
The CCP has neurophysiological underpinnings. We are adept at recognizing three-
dimensional objects in drawings that contain only outlines. (In fact, we can’t help but
perceive three-dimensional objects. We always see a Necker cube as pointing either
in or out.) Why is it so easy to recognize an outline as an object? The answer is,
because of the way the brain processes visual information. The seminal work of Hubel
and Wiesel [79] supports the following account. Visual information flows from retinal
receptor cells via retinal ganglion cells to either of two lateral geniculate nuclei, and on
to the primary visual cortex. The receptive field of each retinal ganglion or geniculate
cell is divided into either an excitatory center and a concentric inhibitory surround (the
“on center” configuration) or the reverse configuration (“off center”). (The group of
retinal receptor cells from which a retinal ganglion or geniculate cell receives input is
known as the cell’s receptive field.) Thus an “on center” cell responds best to a circular
spot of light of a specific size, responds well to a bright line that just covers the center
(since then most of the surround is not covered by the line), and does not respond at
all if both center and surround are fully and equally illuminated.
When visual information reaches the visual cortex, two major transformations take
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place. One leads to the fusion of input from both eyes, the other to a rearrangement of
incoming information so that most of its cells respond to specifically oriented line seg-
ments. The optimal stimulus may be a bright line on a dark background or the reverse,
or it may be a boundary between light and dark regions. One group of orientation-
specific neurons responds best to lines with just the right tilt in a particular part of the
visual field. Another group of neurons, receiving input from the first group, is less par-
ticular about the position of the line and responds best if the line is swept in a particular
direction across the visual field.
These data indicate that the visual representation of a physical environment arises
by way of an analysis of the visual field that is based on contrast information from
boundaries between homogeneously lit regions. No sense data arrive from regions that
are homogeneously colored and evenly lit. The interior of such a region is filled in on the
basis of contrast information stemming from its boundary. This explains why outline
drawings are readily recognized as objects: The brain adds surfaces to outlines in the
same way as it adds (unperceived) colored surfaces to (perceived) changes in color and
brightness across edges. It also explains why the blind spot is not perceived if it falls
inside a homogeneous region (no sense data arrive from such a region anyway), and why
color perception is so remarkably faithful to the reflectances of colored surfaces, and
correspondingly insensitive to the spectral composition of the actual radiances of such
surfaces [6].31 And most importantly, the manner in which visual information is analyzed
by the visual cortex explains why the synchronic multiplicity of the phenomenal world
conforms to the CCP: Unlike the physical world, the phenomenal world is constructed
from boundaries, and these are filled in with qualia. A trivial consequence of this is that
two objects in the phenomenal world, unlike two objects in the physical world, cannot
be at the same place: The existence of two objects in phenomenal space implies the
existence of at least one separating boundary.
The phenomenal world differs from the physical world not only in that it is spatially
differentiated in conformity with the CCP, but also in that it is intrinsically differenti-
ated. The visual field is differentiated not only extrinsically by differences in perceived
content but also intrinsically by the retinal receptor cells – it is inherently grainy. That
we are unaware of this graininess is another consequence of how the brain processes
visual information. Recall that no sense data arrive from uniformly colored regions of
the visual field. Such regions are filled in, and are filled in smoothly or homogeneously.32
The inherent graininess of boundaries is similarly glossed over. Cells that respond to
specifically oriented line segments in a particular part of the visual field receive input
from cells that have circular receptive fields with centers lying along a straight line.
The information coming from the latter type of cell is grainy; the line segment that is
perceived when the former type of cell is stimulated, is not. The phenomenal world thus
is intrinsically a world of sharp and continuous boundaries filled with homogeneous con-
31If color perception is based on discontinuous color changes across edges, continuous variations in
illumination across the visual field go unperceived.
32Since this involves the transition from objective brain mechanisms to subjective visual percepts, just
how the filling in is accomplished is presently as impenetrable as the question of how anything material
can be conscious in the first place.
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tent, while the physical world is intrinsically a world of fuzzy spatial relations between
relata that, but for their relations, are numerically identical. There could hardly be a
greater difference between the two.
Many thinkers have been intrigued, and justifiably so, by the ability of the human
mind to reproduce the physical world as faithfully as it does, or seems to do, using
nothing but logic and mathematics.33 The success of physics is indeed astonishing,
but the difficulties we face in understanding quantum mechanics reveal that we are
not all that well-equipped mentally. As McGinn [82] has stressed, “[w]e are, cognitively
speaking as well as physically, spatial beings par excellence: our entire conceptual scheme
is shot through with spatial notions, these providing the skeleton of our thought in
general.” The trouble is that our neurophysiological make-up conditions these spatial
notions to conform to the CCP. Recall from note 1 that the neural processes which
produce visual percepts and those which produce visual images are to some extent the
same. As a consequence, every thought about the physical world that involves visual
imagery is invariably deceived by some of the neural processes on which it depends.
To conclude, in order to make sense of quantum mechanics, we must detach our
spatial notions from visual imagery. We must learn to conceive of formless entities.
We must disregard the intrinsic multiplicity of phenomenal space. We must think of
spatial relations as ontologically prior both to forms and to the multiplicity of the
corresponding relata. (Without spatial relations, all there is is existence itself. This
takes on the appearance of a world of forms when it enters into spatial relations with
itself.) And we must counter the inherent definiteness of visual percepts and images by
resorting to probabilistic concepts and contrary-to-fact conditionals. Last but not least,
we must desist from conceiving individuation along lines laid down by the CCP.
According to Strawson [83], the logical distinction between particular and universal,
and hence between subject and predicate, is founded on spatial distinctness. “We regard
x and y as distinct particular instances of the same universal P just in so far as we
acknowledge that x and y are at distinct places” [82, original emphasis]. Quantum
mechanics tells us otherwise. Being at distinct places is indeed sufficient for being
distinct instances of existence itself, but it is not necessary. What is necessary for being
distinct instances is the existence of a spatial relation. This can be such that, relative
to the laboratory frame, the two instances are not at distinct places. Nor can existence
itself be thought of as a universal (Sec. 4). E is not the most general predicate but
the ultimate subject. Material objects owe their existence to the existence of spatial
relations, and these owe their existence not to a predicable universal but to the one
existence that they manifoldly relate.
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